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The Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Shelby County v. Holder relied on the
“fundamental principle” and “historic tradition” of equal sovereignty to hold
one of the Voting Rights Act’s key provisions unconstitutional. Yet almost three
years after Shelby County, and despite a recent wave of equal sovereignty
challenges to major federal programs, the equal sovereignty principle remains
largely unexamined. This Article seeks to provide some clarity—both to estab-
lish the contours of the equal sovereignty doctrine and to evaluate whether it is
a sound rule of constitutional federalism.
The principle of equal sovereignty, as initially articulated by courts and subse-
quently explained by Shelby County, is an invented tradition that courts have
used to justify independent determinations about federalism. Equal sover-
eignty was initially invented to address the constitutional challenges posed by
the admission of new states. Conditions on the admission of new states some-
times diverged from then-common understandings about the proper balance
between federal and state authority. And courts relied on appeals to equal
sovereignty to ward off these challenges and adhere to contemporary rules
about the scope of Congress’s delegated powers and the spheres in which the
states were sovereign. Shelby County similarly used equal sovereignty to jus-
tify an independent claim about the states’ proper role in the federal system—
that the states’ dignity entitles them to be viewed and treated as morally well-
behaving institutions. Critically analyzing how courts have used the equal sov-
ereignty principle reveals equal sovereignty for what it is—a set of arguments
about the states’ proper role in the federal system—and allows us to engage
with these arguments as such. While some early state admissions cases re-
present sensible contemporary efforts to balance competing principles of struc-
ture, Shelby County’s claim about federalism rests on highly questionable
ideas related to state dignity.
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“There is . . . a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the
States . . . .”1
Introduction
In 2013, Shelby County v. Holder relied on the principle of equal sover-
eignty to hold one of the key provisions of the Voting Rights Act (VRA)
unconstitutional.2 The provision contained a coverage formula that deter-
mined which jurisdictions were required to obtain federal approval (from a
panel of federal judges or the Attorney General) before changing their voting
laws.3 The coverage formula required nine states to seek preclearance to
amend their voting laws.4
When it was originally passed in 1965, the VRA required preclearance in
any jurisdiction that had a test or device to restrict voting and less than 50
percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 presidential election.5 Con-
gress subsequently reauthorized the VRA in 19706 and 1975,7 and when it
1. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621, 2624 (2013).
2. Id. at 2624.
3. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1973b (recodified at 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (2012))).
4. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624.
5. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(a).
6. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315.
7. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, secs. 101, 202, §§ 4(a),
4(b), 89 Stat. 400, 400–01.
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did so it expanded the coverage formula to include jurisdictions with restric-
tive voting practices and low turnout in the 1968 or 1972 elections.8 The
2006 reauthorization retained the same coverage formula as the 1975 and
1982 reauthorizations: preclearance was required only in jurisdictions that
had an unlawful voting test or device and low turnout as of 1972, 1968, or
1964.9
In 2009, three years after Congress reauthorized the VRA, Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO) expressed
constitutional doubts about the reauthorization.10 Four years after that,
Shelby County invalidated the coverage formula in an opinion that opened
and concluded with references to equal sovereignty.11 Shelby County repeat-
edly emphasized how the coverage formula “differentiate[d] between the
States” by requiring “only nine States” to preclear voting laws.12 The opinion
devoted paragraphs to describing differences that the VRA created between
covered and noncovered jurisdictions,13 and there were numerous references
to the Act’s “disparate” or “differential” treatment of the states.14 The equal
sovereignty principle was, in the Court’s words, “highly pertinent” to why
the coverage formula was unconstitutional.15 And the only provision Shelby
County invalidated was the coverage formula—the provision that resulted in
different states being subjected to differential treatment.16
Yet almost three years after Shelby County, the equal sovereignty princi-
ple remains underexamined.17 Many scholars have written about the imme-
diate consequences of Shelby County and specifically how to prevent voter
discrimination and disenfranchisement in the absence of the preclearance
process.18 But the question raised by the decision’s reasoning—whether
8. Id. secs. 3–4, §§ 4(a), 4(b).
9. Compare Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 10101, 10301), with Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-205, sec. 2, §§ 4(a), 4(b), 96 Stat. 131, and Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
secs. 101, 202, §§ 4(a), 4(b).
10. 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (construing VRA bailout provision to include
municipalities).
11. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618, 2630–31 (2013).
12. Id. at 2621, 2624.
13. Id. at 2624, 2627.
14. E.g., id. at 2622, 2624.
15. Id. at 2624.
16. Id. at 2631.
17. E.g., Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Su-
preme Court and Legal Change, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 2109, 2134, 2136 (2015) (“The Court’s
creation of the equal sovereignty principle . . . . raised many more questions than it an-
swered. . . . Shelby County will not be the last word on equal sovereignty: . . . federal courts will
. . . grapple with the logic and limits of the equal sovereignty principle for a while.”).
18. E.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Justifying a Revised Voting Rights Act: The Guarantee Clause and
the Problem of Minority Rule, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1551 (2014); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment,
Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 95 (2013); Nicholas O. Stepha-
nopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 Sup. Ct. Rev. 55, 56 (“An urgent question in
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Congress may distinguish among the states—has not received a similar
amount of sustained attention.19 In the wake of Shelby County, litigants have
brought equal sovereignty challenges to several statutes, including major
federal spending programs such as Medicaid.20 And the federal courts have
struggled to make sense of what the equal sovereignty principle now
means.21 This Article therefore seeks to provide some clarity—both to estab-
lish the contours of the equal sovereignty principle and to evaluate whether
it is a sound rule of constitutional federalism.
Shelby County justified the equal sovereignty principle in conventionalist
terms. For example, the opinion referred to “our historic tradition that all
the States enjoy equal sovereignty.”22 And Shelby County highlighted several
cases—Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, Texas v. White, United States v. Louisiana,
and Coyle v. Smith—that purportedly affirmed the equal sovereignty princi-
ple.23 Shelby County claimed continuity with these cases, noting that “[o]ver
a hundred years ago, [Coyle v. Smith] explained that our Nation ‘was and is a
union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority.’ ”24
the wake of Shelby County (and the subject of this article) is what will happen now to minority
representation in the areas that formerly were covered by Section 5.”); Franita Tolson, Congres-
sional Authority to Protect Voting Rights After Shelby County and Arizona Inter Tribal, 13 Elec-
tion L.J. 322 (2014).
19. After Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO),
557 U.S. 193 (2009), expressed constitutional doubts about the VRA, but before Shelby
County, 133 S. Ct. 2612, Professor Zachary Price argued there was no state equality principle.
Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
Online 24, 24 (2013), http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/NYULawReviewOn-
line-88-1-Price_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/JU72-Y6TA]. But see Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2649
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In today’s decision, the Court ratchets up what was pure dictum in
Northwest Austin . . . .”). Before Shelby County was decided, Joseph Fishkin suggested the
briefing and argument challenging the VRA relied on notions of “equal dignity.” Joseph
Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 Yale L.J. Online 175 (2013), http://
www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/1174_iyst6fvo.pdf [http://perma.cc/7STA-PZFA]. I agree with
Fishkin’s focus on dignity, but having the actual opinion allows for more focused analysis.
20. E.g., Mayhew v. Burwell, 772 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (“Maine DHHS . . . argu[es]
that the federal disapproval” of Maine’s Medicaid Amendment “violates Maine’s right to equal
sovereignty . . . .”); see also NCAA v. Governor of New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 214 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“New Jersey argues that PASPA . . . violates . . . the ‘equal sovereignty’ principle . . . .”); United
States v. Liu, No. 2:13-CR-00050, 2015 WL 163006, at *1, *21 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2015) (equal
sovereignty challenge to Controlled Substances Act); United States v. Wilde, 74 F. Supp. 3d
1092, 1093–94, 1099–1100 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (same); United States v. Heying, No. 14-CR-30
(JRT/SER), 2014 WL 5286153, at *16 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2014) (same).
21. For example, the Third Circuit had a somewhat puzzling explanation for why it re-
jected an equal sovereignty challenge to a statute enacted under Congress’s commerce power.
The Third Circuit reasoned that “while the guarantee of uniformity in treatment amongst the
states cabins some of Congress’ powers, no such guarantee limits the Commerce Clause.”
NCAA, 730 F.3d at 238 (citations omitted). But this reasoning ignores that the VRA was en-
acted pursuant to the Fifteenth Amendment, which does not contain an explicit uniformity
requirement. U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 2 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.”).
22. 133 S. Ct. at 2621 (quoting NAMUDNO, 557 U.S. at 203).
23. Id. at 2623.
24. Id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)).
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But the doctrinal basis of the equal sovereignty principle is far less com-
pelling than these statements suggest. To be sure, in the early nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, the Court invalidated several conditions on the admis-
sion of new states.25 And, in the course of doing so, the Court sometimes
made very broad statements about the states’ purported equality.26 But the
Court also offered alternative articulations of the equal sovereignty princi-
ple. At times, it suggested that the equal sovereignty principle only requires
Congress to admit new states on the same terms as the original states;27
other times, it suggested that the principle only forbids Congress from im-
posing an admission condition that violates other constitutional rules—that
is, constitutional rules other than the equal sovereignty principle.28
The admission condition cases are, for several reasons, better under-
stood in this latter light. The admission conditions that the Court invali-
dated, or read to have little effect, would have altered the balance of power
between the state and federal governments in ways that challenged contem-
porary understandings about the respective spheres of federal and state au-
thority. Courts thus constructed historical narratives about the states’ equal
sovereignty to ward off these challenges and adhere to then-prevalent under-
standings about the scope of Congress’s delegated powers.29 Understood in
this light, the equal sovereignty principle is a kind of invented tradition—a
social practice whose authority allegedly stems from longstanding obser-
vance, but which turns out to be somewhat recent in origin.30
Shelby County broadened the equal sovereignty principle beyond how it
had been used in prior cases. Whereas the nineteenth- and twentieth-cen-
tury equal sovereignty cases invalidated conditions that exceeded the scope
of Congress’s delegated powers or interfered in a sphere in which the states
were sovereign, Shelby County specifically disclaimed ruling on the constitu-
tional validity of the preclearance regime itself. As such, the decision did not
hold that the particular condition imposed on some of the states,
preclearance, was itself unconstitutional.
25. E.g., Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221 (1845).
26. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (“ ‘This Union’ was and is a union of states,
equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.” (quoting U.S. Const. art. IV,
§ 3)).
27. E.g., id. at 566 (Congress’s power to admit new states “is not [a power] to admit
political organizations which are less or greater, or different in dignity or power.” (emphasis
added)); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900) (“[A] State admitted into the Union
enters therein in full equality with all the other[ ] [States] . . . .” (emphasis added)).
28. E.g., Coyle, 221 U.S. at 573 (suggesting Congress may not impose conditions that
“would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation after admission”).
29. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in The Invention of Tradi-
tion 1, 9 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terrence Ranger eds., 2004) (noting how invented traditions
“establish[ ] or legitimiz[e] . . . [particular] relations of authority”).
30. Id. at 1; cf. Richard A. Primus, Judicial Power and Mobilizable History, 65 Md. L. Rev.
171, 173 (2006) (“Courts play an important role in developing and transmitting narratives and
images of constitutional history.”).
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Recognizing that Shelby County changed the doctrine raises two ques-
tions. First, was Shelby County’s doctrinal expansion justified? Shelby County
maintained that equal sovereignty is a “fundamental” principle of constitu-
tional structure.31 And Thomas Colby and Jeffrey Schmitt have recently de-
fended this idea, arguing that under the Constitution, “[n]o state, new or
old, can have more or less sovereignty than the other states.”32 But while the
principle of equal sovereignty, or equal states, has deep roots in both consti-
tutional discourse and doctrine, it is far from a core constitutional principle.
The equal sovereignty principle is not cleanly derived from any source that is
widely recognized by courts or commentators as a valid basis for constitu-
tional rules.33 The principle is not articulated in the constitutional text, its
historical roots are thin, and it potentially undermines other principles of
structure that are embodied in the Constitution at a similar level of general-
ity, such as federalism and nationalism. Nor has equal sovereignty been es-
tablished through a pattern of congressional practice or more gradually
spelled out by courts over time.34 Congress has frequently distinguished
among the states—even in early Congresses—and the Court has, on numer-
ous occasions, upheld laws that distinguish among the states.35 The most
that can be said for the principle is that we can tell ourselves a story that
connects it with the Tenth Amendment, which is associated with state sover-
eignty, or with the structure of the Constitution, from which many different
principles could potentially be inferred. It is also possible to define the prin-
ciple narrowly—if arbitrarily—so as not to invalidate that many federal
laws. But that hardly seems enough to justify the rule that Congress is con-
stitutionally required to treat the states equally.
Second, recognizing that Shelby County changed the doctrine raises the
question of how it did so—that is, what does the equal sovereignty principle
now mean? While Shelby County purported to rely on a rule that federal laws
must generally treat the states equally, it is not always clear what it means for
31. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
32. Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 Duke L.J. (forth-
coming 2016) (manuscript at 19), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2616889 [http://perma.cc/3Y3C-Q79W]; see also Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shelby
County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty, 68 Okla. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (manu-
script at 14), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628225 [http://perma.cc/
7HTJ-YYPZ] (“Although the principle of equal state sovereignty is not explicitly stated in the
Constitution’s text or required by the holding of any preexisting case, the principle is entirely
consistent with, and perhaps even supported by, both sources.”).
33. See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1079, 1128–35
(2013) (identifying text, structure, ethos, doctrine, and history as sources of constitutional
law); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional
Text, 64 Duke L.J. 1213, 1239–40 (2015) (summarizing similar categories in Philip Bobbitt’s
modalities-of-constitutional-interpretation argument).
34. See generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 33, at 1239–40 (identifying historical prac-
tice as source of constitutional law); Primus, supra note 33, at 1135–36 (identifying precedent
as source of constitutional law).
35. See, e.g., supra notes 19 and 21.
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federal law to treat the states “equally.” The concept of equality is amor-
phous,36 and a rule requiring the federal government to treat the States
equally could mean several different things.37 Some ways of thinking about
equality distinguish between disparate treatment (rules that contain express
classifications) and disparate effects (rules that are formally equal but result
in differential effects on different groups). In the context of states, a rule
requiring Congress to treat the states equally might take the form of a no-
state-identification principle that prohibits Congress from specifically iden-
tifying particular states to single them out for different treatment. But a rule
requiring Congress to treat the states equally might also take the form of a
no-disparate-effects principle that prohibits Congress from regulating in
ways that have differential effects on different states. Or a rule requiring
Congress to treat the states equally might embody both of these principles,
or some combination of the two.
Courts might adopt a no-state-identification principle or a no-dispa-
rate-effects principle—or some combination of the two—as a means to
identify a narrower category of constitutionally problematic laws.38 That is,
there might be nothing wrong with disparate treatment as such, or with
disparate effects as a general matter. But the doctrine might adopt a pre-
sumption that laws codifying disparate treatment, or resulting in disparate
effects, are unconstitutional as a way to smoke out particular laws that are
constitutionally questionable. Disparate treatment might be impermissible
either when it reflects an impermissible purpose or communicates an imper-
missible message. So too for laws that result in disparate effects, which might
36. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Substance of Equality, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1350, 1351
(1991) (“The language of ‘equality’ and ‘inequality,’ then, seems appropriate in the discussion
of these cases. But that language can be frustratingly mercurial in its application.”); Peter
Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 537, 579–80 (1982). For critiques of
Westen’s argument, see Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen,
81 Mich. L. Rev. 575 (1983), and Kenneth W. Simons, The Logic of Egalitarian Norms, 80 B.U.
L. Rev. 693 (2000).
37. The scholars who, prior to Shelby County, had assumed some kind of equal sover-
eignty principle exists offered different accounts of what kinds of federal laws implicate the
equal sovereignty principle. E.g., Valerie J. M. Brader, Congress’ Pet: Why the Clean Air Act’s
Favoritism of California Is Unconstitutional Under the Equal Footing Doctrine, 13 Hastings W.-
Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 119, 156 (2007); Thomas B. Colby, Revitalizing the Forgotten Uni-
formity Constraint on the Commerce Power, 91 Va. L. Rev. 249, 335 (2005) (“The troubling
statutes are those that establish rules or standards that apply differently in different states or
that treat some states (or localities) differently than others . . . .”); Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1519 (2007) (“More plausibly,
state equality might operate to preclude measures that single out particular states for distinct
treatment.”).
38. Equal protection doctrine distinguishes between disparate treatment and disparate
impact. See, e.g., Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
Harv. L. Rev. 493 (2003). And it may do so in order to identify laws that are motivated by
impermissible purposes or laws that communicate impermissible messages. See id. Reva B.
Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race
Equality Cases, 120 Yale L.J. 1278 (2011).
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be impermissible either when they reflect an impermissible purpose or com-
municate an impermissible message. In the context of equal sovereignty, it
could be the case that Congress cannot constitutionally enact laws that are
motivated by animus toward particular states, or laws that communicate the
message that some states are worse than others. And courts could presume
that disparate treatment is unconstitutional, or that laws resulting in dispa-
rate effects are unconstitutional as a means of identifying laws of these sorts.
Whether these presumptions make sense may turn on the extent to which
laws codifying disparate treatment of states, or resulting in differential ef-
fects on different states, tend to reflect an impermissible purpose or
message.
Because the VRA’s coverage formula did not specifically mention the
names of particular states, it might be the case that Shelby County embodies
a no-disparate-effects principle such that all laws that have differential ef-
fects on different states presumptively implicate the equal sovereignty princi-
ple. And there are some parts of the opinion that trade in the no-disparate-
effects principle.39 Shelby County, however, asserted continuity with a tradi-
tion of equal sovereignty and depicted the VRA as “extraordinary.”40 Moreo-
ver, many federal statutes single out particular states for different treatment
or result in different effects on different states.41 These statutes—and the
cases upholding them—coupled with Shelby County’s self-professed conven-
tionalism, suggest the doctrine does not, and should not, adopt a blunt pre-
sumption that laws are unconstitutional when they result in differential
effects on different states. And Shelby County can plausibly be read to reflect
a narrower concern with what the VRA signified or expressed about the
covered states. Under this narrower reading, Shelby County manifested a
concern with laws that single out particular states as having acted in ways
that offend our shared notions of right and wrong—concerns that are
rooted in the idea that the states are constitutionally entitled to be viewed
and treated with dignity.
This Article therefore conceptualizes the scope of the equal sovereignty
principle in terms of dignity. Under this view, laws will offend the equal
sovereignty principle if they single out particular states that have behaved in
especially immoral ways and subject those states to regulations that evoke an
especially subservient and hierarchical relationship between the states and
the federal government. Conceptualizing the equal sovereignty principle in
terms of dignity characterizes it as an expressive norm—that is, a norm con-
cerned with the meaning and communicative content of laws. Framing the
equal sovereignty principle in terms of dignity also narrows the scope of the
principle such that it will apply almost exclusively to legislation enacted
under the Reconstruction Amendments. Those Amendments authorize
39. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2624 (2013) (“While one State waits
months or years and expends funds to implement a validly enacted law, its neighbor can
typically put the same law into effect immediately, through the normal legislative process.”).
40. Id. at 2618, 2624–26, 2628, 2630.
41. See infra Section II.D.
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Congress to regulate states when states have violated constitutional prohibi-
tions. Congressional statutes enacted pursuant to these Amendments are
therefore more likely to single out particular states as having done some-
thing wrong and to communicate the message that those states are especially
morally blameworthy. By narrowing the scope of the equal sovereignty prin-
ciple, this conception insulates from equal sovereignty challenges the many
existing federal statutes that differentiate between the states.
But conceptualizing the equal sovereignty principle in terms of dignity
does little by way of justifying the principle itself. Rather, it contributes to
the questionable state of doctrinal affairs in which Congress’s powers are
more limited under the Reconstruction Amendments than under Article I.
And the idea that Congress is uniquely limited in differentiating between the
states under the Reconstruction Amendments has especially little basis in the
text, history, or structure of those Amendments. Conceptualizing the equal
sovereignty principle in terms of dignity thus has significant flaws. But un-
derstanding Shelby County in this light makes sense of what the Court said
in Shelby County and also results in fewer statutes being vulnerable to equal
sovereignty challenges compared to other readings of the decision.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I explains the doctrine as it ex-
isted prior to Shelby County. Part I argues that the equal sovereignty doctrine
prior to Shelby County is best understood as a placeholder for a set of limits
on Congress’s powers—namely, that Congress may only exercise its dele-
gated powers and that the Constitution prohibits Congress from interfering
with certain aspects of the states’ sovereignty. However, Shelby County used
equal sovereignty in a different way—the opinion specifically disavowed rul-
ing on whether the preclearance process exceeded the scope of Congress’s
powers or violated some affirmative constraint on how Congress may regu-
late the states, aside from equal sovereignty.
Part II then analyzes whether Shelby County was justified in expanding
the equal sovereignty principle. This Article argues it was not. The equal
sovereignty principle, however defined, is far from a core constitutional
principle—the text and historical sources do not specify such a principle;
Congress has frequently distinguished among the states in a variety of ways;
and the Court has upheld its doing so. Equal sovereignty will also under-
mine other constitutional values, such as federalism and nationalism, which
are embodied in the Constitution at a similar level of generality as equal
sovereignty.
Part III then unpacks how Shelby County may have changed the doc-
trine. Read in conjunction with other doctrines that rely on related ideas
about equality and sovereignty, Shelby County appears to rely on a particular
conception of state dignity. According to that conception, courts should
carefully scrutinize federal laws that suggest some states should be subject to
close federal supervision because they have behaved in especially immoral
and blameworthy ways. Part IV then critically analyzes whether Shelby
County’s doctrinal change is a good one.
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I. Invention: Doctrinal Origins
Prior to Shelby County, the Supreme Court invoked the equal sover-
eignty principle in a series of cases invalidating or narrowly reading condi-
tions on the admission of new states.42 During this time the equal
sovereignty doctrine had two elements. One line of reasoning suggested that
all states must be admitted on the same terms as the original states. The
second line of reasoning used equal sovereignty as a placeholder for uncon-
stitutional conditions, meaning that conditions were invalid if they violated
some other constitutional principle aside from equal sovereignty.
A. Admission Conditions
Occasionally, courts suggested that the equal sovereignty principle re-
quired Congress to admit all states on the same terms as the original states.
Other cases, however, disavowed this conception of equal sovereignty, and
Congress frequently admitted the states on different terms from one an-
other. Moreover, a rule requiring Congress to admit all states on the same
terms would have prevented Congress from imposing even those conditions
that furthered constitutional values like federalism and nationalism.
The equal sovereignty principle initially appeared in cases addressing
conditions on the admission of new states. Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan consid-
ered what effect a provision in Alabama’s Enabling Act had on the states’
title to lands underlying navigable waters.43 The Enabling Act purported to
require the State of Alabama to disclaim all title to unappropriated lands,44
and Pollard held that the relevant provision did not provide the United
States with title to lands underlying navigable waters.45 Coyle v. Smith subse-
quently invalidated a condition in Oklahoma’s Enabling Act that purported
to require Oklahoma to keep Guthrie as the state capitol for seven years.46
These and other cases frequently articulated a fairly specific vision of
what equal sovereignty meant—namely, that Congress must admit every
42. Some cases Shelby County and NAMUDNO mentioned do little to explain the equal
sovereignty principle. Texas v. White held that Texas had not ceased to become a state when it
purported to secede. 74 U.S. 700, 726 (1868). But the opinion made no particular mention of
the equality of the states rather than the indivisibility of the states in the Union. The Court’s
second holding also assumed that the federal government could establish a temporary or pro-
visional government for former rebel states. Id. at 729–30. As the Shelby County dissent noted,
South Carolina v. Katzenbach upheld a prior VRA reauthorization and, in doing so, suggested
that the doctrine of the equality of states “applies only to the terms upon which States are
admitted to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently ap-
peared.” Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2648 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966)).
43. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220–21 (1845). Before Pollard, Mayor of New Orleans v. United
States held that a similarly worded admission condition did not grant the United States title
over lands dedicated to public squares or levees. 35 U.S. 662 (1836).
44. Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221.
45. Id. at 230.
46. 221 U.S. 559, 573–74 (1911).
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state into the Union on the same terms and with the same powers as the
original states.47 Coyle stated that Congress’s power to admit new states “is
not [a power] to admit political organizations which are less or greater, or
different in dignity or power . . . .”48 United States v. Louisiana stated that the
equal sovereignty principle operated “upon admission.”49 And the Shelby
County dissent criticized the majority’s invocation of equal sovereignty on
the ground that the majority wrongly applied the principle outside of the
terms on which states are admitted to the Union.50
But even this narrow version of equal sovereignty is too broad. Other
cases severely limited the idea that Congress is required to admit all states on
the same terms as the original states. These cases instead suggested that Con-
gress is only required to give new states the same rights to lands underlying
navigable waters as it gave to the original states.51 Newly admitted states have
no right to other lands which the original states possessed, and the United
States can retain title to those lands or limit how states make use of those
lands.52 Furthermore, the United States retains title to significant parcels of
land in states admitted to the Union later in time.53 Congress can also re-
quire a newly admitted state to disclaim title to lands underlying navigable
47. See, e.g., Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 222. These cases also contain some broad state-
ments suggesting that all states forever have the same powers and sovereignty. E.g., id. at 230
(“The new states have the same rights, sovereignty, and jurisdiction . . . as the original
states.”).
48. 221 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added); id. at 567 (“ ‘This Union’ was and is a union of
States, equal in power, dignity and authority . . . . To maintain otherwise would be to say that
. . . through the power of Congress to admit new States, might come to be a union of states
unequal in power . . . .” (emphasis added)).
49. 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960). Other cases similarly defined the principle in terms of admis-
sion. See, e.g., Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 245 (1900) (“[A] State admitted into the
Union enters therein in full equality with all the other[ ] [States] . . . .”).
50. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2648 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
51. E.g., PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1227 (2012) (citing a series of
nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases that, in applying equal sovereignty to newly admitted
states, viewed the principle narrowly).
52. See Texas v. Louisiana, 410 U.S. 702, 713 (1973); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 244
(1913); see also United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 365 (1933) (“[T]he state shall be admit-
ted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States. But the principle of equality is
not disturbed by a legitimate exertion by the United States of its constitutional power in re-
spect of its Indian wards and their property.”); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)
(upholding admission conditions designating areas of New Mexico as “Indian country” subject
to federal regulation); Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912) (upholding admission conditions of
Oklahoma to the Union designating certain areas Indian territory subject to federal regula-
tion); Stearns, 179 U.S. 223 (upholding the validity of provisions in Minnesota’s admission
statute that ceded federal land to state on certain conditions).
53. See Carolyn M. Landever, Whose Home on the Range? Equal Footing, the New Federal-
ism and State Jurisdiction on Public Lands, 47 Fla. L. Rev. 557, 585–86 (1995).
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waters so long as Congress clearly deprives the state of title and the condi-
tion “serve[s] an appropriate public purpose,” such as “ ‘to perform interna-
tional obligations, or . . . for the promotion and convenience of commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States . . . .’ ”54
Additionally, the idea that equal sovereignty prevents Congress from
imposing different admission conditions on different states is vastly out of
step with actual practice. Eric Biber has documented how Congress imposed
conditions on nearly every state entering the Union.55 “Of the thirty-seven
states admitted to the Union since the adoption of the Constitution[,] . . .
almost all of them have had some sort of condition imposed on them when
they were admitted.”56 The conditions ran the gamut of topics—prohibiting
newly admitted states from taxing federal lands,57 requiring a state to use tax
proceeds from blocks of land for particular purposes,58 prescribing proce-
dures for how a state could acquire particular lands,59 and others. Indeed,
Biber claims that Congress used its power to admit new states to impose
conditions on new states that evaded limits on Congress’s other delegated
powers.60 He argues that Congress “use[d] . . . conditions . . . in areas far
removed from the enumerated powers of Article I . . . .”61 For example,
Congress required Louisiana to make English its official language,62 New
Mexico and Arizona to maintain English-speaking schools,63 and Utah to
ban polygamy.64
Admission conditions have been used for other purposes as well. Some
justices suggested that certain admission conditions were designed to benefit
54. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 34, 40, 46 (1997) (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152
U.S. 1, 48 (1894)) (upholding Congress’s grant of title to federal government for purpose of
establishing petroleum reserve); see also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 633–36
(1970) (upholding Congress’s grant of title to lands underlying navigable waters to Native
American tribe); cf. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204–05
(1999) (discussing the federal government’s grant of certain hunting and fishing rights on state
land to Indian tribes).
55. See Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Im-
posed on States Entering the Union, 46 Am. J. Legal Hist. 119, 120, 132 (2004).
56. Id. at 120.
57. E.g., Ohio Enabling Act, ch. 40, § 7, 2 Stat. 173, 175 (1802); see also Van Brocklin v.
Anderson, 117 U.S. 151 (1886) (upholding this condition). Congress imposed this condition
before the Court held that states lacked the power to tax federal instrumentalities. See McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431–33 (1819).
58. E.g., New Mexico–Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 28, 36 Stat. 557, 574 (1910); Er-
vien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919) (upholding conditions related to land trust).
59. E.g., New Mexico–Arizona Enabling Act § 3; Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967)
(enforcing limitation related to land trust).
60. Biber, supra note 55, at 124, 195.
61. Id. at 124.
62. Louisiana Enabling Act, ch. 21, § 3, 2 Stat. 641, 642 (1811); Biber, supra note 55, at
132, 138–39.
63. New Mexico–Arizona Enabling Act § 2; Biber, supra note 55, at 132.
64. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894); Biber, supra note 55, at 132,
150–62.
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newly admitted states. Justice Powell reasoned that because the federal gov-
ernment held more land in newly admitted states than the original states,
Congress ensured new states would have a tax base to support schools by
establishing trusts requiring taxes on certain lands to be used “for the sup-
port of public education.”65 Other conditions reflected the substantive policy
preferences of the states seeking admission, rather than the preferences of
Congress. For example, some western territories strongly supported presi-
dential candidates’ calls to maintain public schools free from religious con-
trol.66 And as a condition on these states’ admission, Congress required the
states to provide for “the establishment and maintenance of systems of pub-
lic schools . . . free from sectarian control.”67
Congress also imposed admission conditions on particular states in fur-
therance of its other delegated powers as well as other nationalist ends. Con-
gress imposed, and the Court upheld, restrictions on commerce with Native
American tribes or on Native American lands in furtherance of its powers to
regulate commerce with Native American tribes and to regulate federal
lands.68 Other conditions regulated the land settlement process, such as by
restricting how land could be distributed or used, in furtherance of Con-
gress’s power to admit new states to the Union.69 And Eric Biber suggested
that, among the conditions that appeared to fall outside the scope of Con-
gress’s Article I powers, many responded to perceived differences in newly
admitted states and sought to “assimilate[ ] [a state] as a loyal, democratic
unit of government . . . .”70 For example, in addition to the conditions im-
posed on Utah and New Mexico,71 the Reconstruction Congress imposed
conditions on Southern states before allowing those states representation in
65. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 523–24 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amend-
ments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 551, 573–75
(2003) (explaining that the western territories strongly “supported Blaine’s position” of insu-
lating schools from religious influences); Joseph P. Viteritti, Davey’s Plea: Blaine, Blair, Witters,
and the Protection of Religious Freedom, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 299, 314 (2003) (noting
that the Washington territorial delegation “endorsed Blaine’s well-popularized views on relig-
ion and education”).
67. E.g., Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, 25 Stat. 676, 677.
68. E.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913); see U.S. Const. art. I, § 8; U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
69. E.g., ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989) (limits on distribution of mineral
lands); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900) (tax limitations on railroads); see U.S.
Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; see id. art. I, § 8 (allowing Congress to “make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution . . . all other powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the government of the United States”). Different sources characterize the federal inter-
ests in these restrictions in different ways. See Daniel Feller, The Public Lands In
Jacksonian Politics 18–38 (U. Wisc. ed. 1984); Peter S. Onuf, Statehood and Union: A
History of the Northwest Ordinance 3-15 (1987) (arguing that with respect to newly
admitted states, national policymakers were concerned with preserving the Union and paying
off debts).
70. Biber, supra note 55, at 120, 132.
71. Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894); Biber, supra note 55, at 132,
150–68.
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Congress.72 Congress required southern states to include provisions in their
constitutions to secure blacks’ political rights and to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment.73 The Constitution’s nationalist structure exists in part to em-
power the federal government so that it is able to effectively exercise its dele-
gated powers;74 it also enables the Union to function as one cohesive unit.75
And admission conditions were sometimes used to further these purposes.
Thus, the idea that equal sovereignty requires Congress to admit all states on
the same terms as the original states is inconsistent with case law, longstand-
ing congressional practice, and other principles of constitutional structure,
such as federalism and nationalism.76
B. Placeholder for Unconstitutional Conditions
Equal sovereignty also sometimes referred to a prohibition against un-
constitutional conditions. The principle served as something akin to a
placeholder for certain limits on Congress’s powers—namely, that Congress
may only exercise its delegated powers and that the states are sovereign or
autonomous in certain spheres. Coyle, for example, suggested that the equal
sovereignty principle prohibited Congress from imposing conditions that
“would not be valid and effectual if the subject of congressional legislation
after admission.”77 That is, the state admission cases used “equal sover-
eignty” to refer to two constitutional limits on Congress’s powers: (1) Con-
gress may only impose laws, including conditions on the admission of new
72. This Article does not attempt to reargue the lawfulness of Congress’s decision to
deny Southern states representation. Compare, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section
5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 Harv. L. Rev. F. 109 (2013) (arguing that the Reconstruction
Congress’s preapproval process for states with deficient voting rules was a proper federal en-
forcement of the Constitution), with John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 375, 390–91, 410–14 (2001) (proposing that amendments to
the Constitution may be validly ratified despite possible constitutional violations of state au-
tonomy in ratification process).
73. See infra text accompanying notes 398–399.
74. See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133–135 (2010) (“ ‘[A] government,
entrusted with such’ powers ‘must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.’ ”
(quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 326, 408 (1819))); James L. Kainen, Book
Review, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 196, 198 (1998) (“[Chief Justice Marshall’s] focus was on
assuring that Congress might effectively exercise the powers expressly given it by the Constitu-
tion . . . .”). Senator Ruggles posed the question as follows: “Must Congress adopt precisely the
same laws on this subject . . . ? Is there no opportunity for discretion, for alteration, or detail?
Such a course of reasoning would be absurd . . . .” 16 Annals of Cong. 280 (1820).
75. Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1085, 1085–86
(2014) (“[U]nion . . . mean[s] the interest in binding the several states into a single political
community.”).
76. The drafting history of the Constitution also arguably implies that Congress is not
required to admit all states on the same terms. The Constitutional Convention rejected a pro-
posal requiring new states to “be admitted on the same terms with the original States.” 2 The
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 454 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter
Farrand].
77. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573–74 (1911).
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states, that fall within its delegated powers, and (2) Congress may not enact
laws, including conditions on the admission of new states, that interfere with
spheres in which the states are sovereign or autonomous.78 Compared to the
prior conception of equal sovereignty as a limit on Congress’s ability to im-
pose different admission conditions on different states, this is the better un-
derstanding of how previous cases used the equal sovereignty principle—
because it is  consistent with a close reading of the early equal sovereignty
cases; it makes sense of both subsequent cases and congressional practice;
and it coheres with the text and structure of the Constitution. But under-
standing equal sovereignty as a placeholder for limits on Congress’s powers
does not do much to identify what those limits are. And whatever limits
apply to Congress’s power to admit new states may not apply to Congress’s
other delegated powers, such as its power to execute treaties.
Several equal sovereignty cases can be reasonably explained as reflecting
the concern that certain admission conditions fell outside the scope of Con-
gress’s delegated powers or intruded on a sphere the Constitution reserved
to the states. Consider Coyle, for example. Coyle limited Congress to exercis-
ing its delegated powers because, as the Court in that case suggested, it is not
clear how any of Congress’s delegated powers permit Congress to forcibly
locate a state’s capital.79 There was also no narrative in Coyle or legislative
materials that suggested Congress attempted to identify a plausible federal
purpose for selecting Oklahoma’s state capitol. Coyle also suggested that
there are spheres in which the states are sovereign. A key part of Coyle’s
reasoning was that establishing and locating a state capital is a power re-
served to the states.80 In several places, the Constitution assumes that state
governments exist as governmental units.81 And because states—as distinct,
governmental entities—must have a minimal structure of government, it is
78. These two limits overlap at times, especially where a congressional power authorizes
Congress to regulate in a particular area, such as interstate commerce. See Richard Primus, The
Limits of Enumeration, 124 Yale L.J. 576, 603 (2014) (explaining how the Court’s Commerce
Clause decisions, such as Hammer v. Dagenhert, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), could be understood
either to say that a regulation exceeds the scope of Congress’s delegated powers or that it
interferes in a regulatory sphere reserved to the states). And the idea that Congress may not
regulate in particular spheres has two distinct threads—that there are certain areas of regula-
tion and certain forms of regulation that are off limits to Congress. An example of the area-of-
regulation limit is United States v. Butler, which invalidated a federal tax on certain forms of
agriculture. 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Butler held the tax unconstitutional because the regulation of
agriculture, as a subject area, lies within “the reserved rights of the states.” Butler, 297 U.S. at
68. An example of the form-of-regulation limit is New York v. United States, which held that
Congress may not require state legislatures to enact particular laws, even where it regulates
within a field the Constitution delegated to it (such as interstate commerce). 505 U.S. 144, 166
(1992).
79. Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567 (stating that upholding condition “would result, first, that the
powers of Congress would not be defined by the Constitution alone”).
80. Id. at 565 (“The power[s] to locate its own seat of government and to determine
when and how it shall be changed from one place to another . . . are essentially and peculiarly
state powers.”).
81. Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 2180, 2246–47 (1998); see, e.g., U.S. Const. art. IV; id. art. I, § 2, cls. 1, 4.
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not unreasonable to think that the power to choose a capitol is reserved to
the states.
Pollard, like Coyle, intimated that Congress is limited to exercising those
powers delegated to it and that Congress cannot interfere in spheres in
which the states are sovereign or autonomous. Pollard directly raised the
possibility that Congress could use an admission condition to expand the
powers delegated to it by the Constitution. Three years before Pollard, the
Supreme Court had held that the Constitution did not give Congress any
title to lands underlying navigable waters.82 In Pollard, the petitioner argued
that Congress could admit a state subject to the condition that the state
disclaim all title to lands underlying navigable waters.83 The case therefore
sharply presented the possibility that Congress could use an admission con-
dition to change an aspect of the federal-state relationship that the Court
had said three years earlier the Constitution established—that state govern-
ments generally own and maintain lands underlying navigable waters.84
There were also other indicia that the title-claiming provision at issue in
Pollard exceeded the scope of Congress’s delegated powers. For example, it
was not clear that the federal government articulated any purpose for which
it would use the submerged lands, so it was not clear which delegated power
the condition furthered.85 And the federal government did not hold the land
at issue free of conditions—the state cession acts and treaties giving the land
to the United States purportedly limited the United States’ title over the
land—further suggesting the federal government sought to do more with
the land than its title allowed it to do.86
Pollard also relied on the idea that the condition invaded a sphere in
which the states were sovereign.87 Pollard maintained that the ownership of
82. See Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
83. See Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 217–18 (1845) (summarizing
arguments).
84. See id. Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe summarized these decisions as follows:
[L]ands underlying navigable waters have historically been considered “sovereign lands.”
State ownership of them has been “considered an essential attribute of sovereignty.” Utah
Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195–98. The Court from an early date
has acknowledged that the people of each of the Thirteen Colonies at the time of inde-
pendence “became themselves sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to
all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own common use, subject
only to the rights since surrendered by the Constitution to the general government.”
Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842) . . . . [A new] State’s title to these
sovereign lands arises from the equal footing doctrine and is “conferred not by Congress
but by the Constitution itself.” Oregon ex rel State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel
Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977).
521 U.S. 261, 283 (1997).
85. See infra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining how, under then-existing pre-
emption doctrine, state laws were preempted only where there was a direct conflict with a
federal law or project).
86. See Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221–22.
87. Id. at 230 (“This right of eminent domain over the shores and the soils under the
navigable waters, for all municipal purposes, belongs exclusively to the states . . . . To give to
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waters used for navigation is an incident of sovereignty reserved to the
states.88 And Pollard construed the pertinent admission condition, which
purported to require the state to disclaim title to all lands, not to apply to
lands underlying navigable waters—lands that were understood at the time
to be held by the government with primary municipal and police powers,
the states.89 Pollard therefore could be understood as an early clear-statement
rule, where the Court presumed Congress had not altered a significant as-
pect of the federal-state relationship or displaced the states’ police powers
without clearly saying so.90 Pollard stated that “if an express stipulation had
been inserted in the [condition], granting the municipal right of sovereignty
and eminent domain to the United States, such stipulation would have been
void and inoperative.”91 But no such provision had been inserted, and the
Court did not read the admission condition to purport to do so.
In their defenses of the equal sovereignty principle, Thomas Colby and
Jeffrey Schmitt note that other cases, such as Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, refer
to equal sovereignty.92 In Escanaba, a shipping company sought to force the
city of Chicago to take down drawbridges it had constructed over the Chi-
cago River on the ground that a condition on the admission of Illinois man-
dated that the navigable waters in the state “shall be common highways and
the United States the right to transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the soils under the
navigable waters, would be placing in their hands a weapon which might be wielded greatly to
the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive the states of the power to exercise a numerous and
important class of police powers.”).
88. Id. at 229; see also Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2132
(2013) (“We have long understood that as sovereign entities in our federal system, the States
possess an ‘absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them for their own
common use.’ ” (quoting Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842))); Coeur d’Alene
Tribe, 521 U.S. at 283 (citing Martin for the same proposition).
89. See Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 221–22 (“Taking the legislative acts of the United
States . . . and giving to each, separately, and to all jointly, a fair interpretation, we must come
to the conclusion that it was the intention of the parties to invest the United States with the
eminent domain of the country ceded, both national and municipal, for the purposes of tempo-
rary government, and to hold it in trust for the performance of the stipulations and conditions
expressed in the deeds of cession and the legislative acts connected with them.” (emphases
added)).
90. See, e.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (“The regulation of domes-
tic relations is traditionally the domain of state law. There is therefore a ‘presumption against
pre-emption’ of state laws governing domestic relations.” (quoting Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532
U.S. 141, 151 (2001))).
91. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 223 (emphasis added).
92. Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 29–31); Schmitt, supra note 32 (manuscript at
19). Colby also cites Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 610 (1845). Colby, supra
note 32 (manuscript at 17). But Permoli held that after a state was admitted to the Union, the
Court did not have jurisdiction to review a state ordinance on the ground that it purportedly
violated a provision in the state constitution that had been required by the enabling statute.
Permoli, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 610 (“In our judgment, the question presented by the record is
exclusively of state cognisance, and equally so in the old states and the new ones; and that the
writ of error must be dismissed.”). If Permoli had held otherwise, every claim founded on a
state constitutional provision related to the Northwest Ordinance or state enabling acts would
be a federal question giving rise to federal jurisdiction.
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forever free.”93 Escanaba ruled for the city of Chicago, Colby claims, because
“Congress could not use [its power to regulate navigable waterways] to grant
Illinois less sovereign authority to regulate her rivers than other states have
to regulate theirs.”94
The problem, however, is that like Pollard, Escanaba concluded that the
pertinent condition did not actually withdraw from the state the power to
construct the particular bridge.95 Escanaba reasoned:
[W]e do not see that the clause of the ordinance upon which reliance is
placed materially affects the question before us. . . . In the sense in which
the terms are used by publicists and statesmen, free navigation is consistent
with ferries and bridges across a river for the transit of persons and
merchandise . . . .”96
Escanaba therefore concluded that the city bridge did not conflict with the
federal mandate that all navigable waters remain unencumbered.97 Escanaba,
like Pollard, appears to have narrowly interpreted the extent to which con-
gressional statutes preclude state legislation, especially in areas thought to be
of primarily state concern.98
93. Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 679, 688 (1882) (quoting Act of August 7,
1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 52 (originally enacted as Northwest Ordinance of 1787)).
94. Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 30).
95. See Schmitt, supra note 32 (manuscript at 18–19). Schmitt also relies on Withers v.
Buckley, 61 U.S. 84 (1857). But Withers, like Escanaba, held the federal provision did not
preclude the particular state improvement. Id. at 92–93 (“It cannot be imputed to Congress
that they ever designed to forbid, or to withhold from the State of Mississippi, the power of
improving the interior of that State . . . by regulating the rivers within its territorial
limits . . . .”).
96. Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 689 (“The navigation of the Illinois river is free . . . from any
tax, impost, or duty, and its character as a common highway is not affected by the fact that it is
crossed by bridges.”).
97. Id. at 690 (“Th[at] provision does not prevent . . . . the construction of any work on
the river which the State may consider important to commercial intercourse. . . . ‘A draw-
bridge across a navigable water is not an obstruction.’ ” (quoting Palmer v. Cuyahoga County,
18 F. Cas. 1026 (C.C.D. Ohio 1834))). Another reason it did not conflict was that Congress
had also not initiated any improvements or projects with which the bridge interfered. Id. at
690–91. This reflected the state of preemption doctrine at the time. Before 1912, “federal law
trumped state law” only “when the two laws conflicted.” Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federal-
ism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 125, 166.
98. Subsequent cases interpreted Escanaba in this way. See, e.g., Cummings v. Chicago,
188 U.S. 410, 428 (1903) (citing Escanaba to frame the question in that case as: “Did Congress,
in the execution of its power under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce, intend
by the legislation in question to supersede, for every purpose, the authority of Illinois over the
erection of structures in navigable waters wholly within its limits?”); see also Paxton Blair,
Federal Bridge Legislation and the Constitution, 36 Yale L.J. 808, 810 (1927) (“The effect of the
decision [was] to declare that the states are the normal source of power to construct bridges
and, save for the exceptional occurrence of positive action by Congress granting original and
plenary power to particular grantees [to say that] they are the only source.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Merritt Starr, Navigable Waters of the United States—State and National Control, 35
Harv. L. Rev. 154, 165 (1921) (“The Congressional control of navigable streams does not
May 2016] Inventing Equal Sovereignty 1225
The cases that invalidated or narrowly construed admission conditions
therefore used equal sovereignty as a placeholder for certain limits on Con-
gress’s powers. Other cases maintained that admission conditions were valid
where the conditions “serve[d] an appropriate public purpose,” meaning the
conditions were related to Congress’s delegated powers.99 Several cases up-
held conditions regulating commerce with Native Americans or commerce
on Native American lands.100 These cases reasoned that “the principle of
equality is not disturbed by a legitimate exertion by the United States of its
constitutional power[s].”101 And, these cases maintained, because the United
States had the power to regulate commerce with Native Americans102 and
dispose of federal property,103 it could exercise those powers by specifically
identifying particular states or by limiting some states’ lawmaking authority
more than others. More recent cases have also characterized the equal sover-
eignty cases in terms of unconstitutional conditions. Courts cite Coyle for
the proposition that “Congress may not dictate a State’s capital.”104 Courts
have similarly characterized Pollard, citing the case and its progeny for the
proposition that the “ownership of submerged lands . . . ‘is an essential
attribute of [state] sovereignty.’”105
In addition to making sense of the doctrine, viewing equal sovereignty
as a placeholder for certain limits on Congress’s powers also coheres with
congressional practice. If Congress can impose admission conditions related
to its delegated powers, Congress may use admission conditions to aid in the
process of admitting new states into the Union because one of Congress’s
delegated powers is admitting new states to the Union. This captures the
essence of many of the admission conditions, which were designed to incor-
porate a newly admitted state into the Union or otherwise aid in the process
of settlement.106
The idea that equal sovereignty serves as a placeholder for other limits
on Congress’s powers also makes reasonable sense of the constitutional text.
exclude the power of the states to authorize the construction and maintenance of improve-
ments which do not interfere either with navigation or with the improvements or control of
the Federal Government.”).
99. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 23 (1997); see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1,
48 (1894) (“Congress has the power to make grants of lands below high water mark of naviga-
ble waters in any Territory of the United States . . . or to carry out other public purposes
appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold the Territory.”).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 363, 365 (1933); United States v.
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45 (1913); Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 691 (1912).
101. Chavez, 290 U.S. at 365.
102. Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. at 690–91.
103. Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1919).
104. E.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011); New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528, 586 (1985).
105. See, e.g., Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2132 (2013) (citing
United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)) (citing cases tracing back to Pollard).
106. See discussion supra Section I.A.
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Article IV gives Congress the power to admit new states but says nothing
about whether the process for admitting new states may include imposing
conditions on those states.107 The only limit on Congress’s power to admit
new states is that new states cannot be formed out of already existing ones.108
And the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress “[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,”
which includes Congress’s power to admit new states.109
Colby objects that this narrow conception of equal sovereignty “seems
ultimately pointless” if “Congress is free to discriminate among any and all
states” once a state is admitted into the Union.110 But different heads of
power authorize Congress to do different things; it would therefore not be
strange if Congress could limit some states’ lawmaking powers more than
others under its power to regulate interstate commerce, but not under its
power to admit new states. Congress may, for example, tax an individual’s
failure to purchase health insurance under the taxing power, even though it
may not do so under the Commerce Clause.111 Congress also may abrogate
the states’ immunity from suits for damages under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment but it may not do so under its power to regulate interstate
commerce.112
Colby relatedly objects that conceptualizing equal sovereignty as a
placeholder for unconstitutional conditions would mean that equal sover-
eignty has virtually no applications today given the broad scope of Con-
gress’s powers.113 But this confuses acquired inconsequence with initial
inconsequence: “[E]ven if we assume that the authors of [constitutional]
rules expect those rules to have applications, it would be a mistake to . . .
take a discovery that a rule has no present applications as proof that the rule
is being wrongly read.”114 Initially, for over a hundred years, the equal-sover-
eignty-as-unconstitutional-conditions doctrine operated as a limit on Con-
gress’s powers.115 As Pollard and Coyle illustrate, the doctrine prevented
Congress from limiting new states’ powers in ways that challenged then-
common understandings about the proper spheres of federal and state
authority.
107. U.S. Const. art. IV.
108. Id. art. IV, § 3.
109. Id. art. I, § 8.
110. Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 22).
111. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
112. Compare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59–66 (1996) (holding that Con-
gress cannot abrogate the states’ immunity from suits for damages under the Commerce
Clause), with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (ruling that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment permits Congress to abrogate the states’ immunity from suits for damages).
113. See Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 22–23).
114. Primus, supra note 78, at 631–32.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 77–91.
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While understanding equal sovereignty as a placeholder for other limits
on Congress’s powers makes sense for many reasons, conceptualizing equal
sovereignty in this way can only tell us so much. Most importantly, identify-
ing equal sovereignty as a placeholder for other limits on Congress’s powers
does not tell us what the relevant limits on Congress’s powers are.116 And the
idea that equal sovereignty serves as a placeholder for other limits on Con-
gress’s powers is a reasonably accurate, and thus viable, constitutional rule
only if the limits on Congress’s powers are fairly narrow in scope. Congress
imposed admission conditions related to many different areas of life, and
today it is unclear in which, if any, spheres Congress may not regulate.117
The subsequent cases that have limited Pollard to apply only to lands under-
lying navigable waters rather than all lands are but one example of how
difficult it is to indefinitely define the proper spheres of federal and state
authority.
Additionally, acknowledging that a particular set of limits applies to
Congress’s power to admit new states does not necessarily mean these limits
also apply to Congress’s other powers, such as Congress’s power to execute
treaties. While different heads of power authorize Congress to do different
things, the power to admit new states and the power to execute treaties share
an important similarity: they do not specify a substantive area in which
Congress may regulate. To some, that is why Congress should only be able to
enact legislation under these powers in areas elsewhere delegated to Con-
gress; otherwise Congress could legislate in all spheres.118
There are, however, reasons why the set of limits that apply to Con-
gress’s power to admit new states might not apply to Congress’s power to
execute treaties. Various doctrines are premised on a set of ideas about why
the federal government is empowered to act in areas of international con-
cern.119 These doctrines underscore the advantages to speaking with one
voice and to pooling resources for greater power in the international
sphere.120 While the federal government does not always have exclusive pur-
view over issues with an international dimension,121 the aforementioned
doctrines provide a reason to think it is a proper exercise in constitutional
federalism for Congress to legislate in areas identified by the international
116. Cf. Andrew Coan, Implementing Enumeration Wm. & Mary L. Rev. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 12–15), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2622238 [http://
perma.cc/EA6X-UPH6] (identifying the flaw in extrapolating limits on Congress’s power from
the idea that there must be limits).
117. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 78, at 596–98; Gil Seinfeld, Article I, Article III, and the
Limits of Enumeration, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1389, 1394–96 (2010).
118. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L.
Rev. 1867 (2005) (raising this concern in the context of Congress’s power to execute treaties).
119. See Seinfeld, supra note 75, at 1109–14.
120. See id.
121. See Cristina M. Rodrı´guez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 Mich. L. Rev. 567 (2008) (arguing that the power to regulate immigration is not an
exclusively federal power).
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community as areas of international concern, such as the execution of trea-
ties. Admission conditions, by contrast, may not necessarily fall in an area
suitable for federal regulation. Moreover, when Congress enacts treaty-re-
lated legislation, all states are represented to a greater extent than those states
seeking admission when Congress imposes admission conditions, because
admission conditions are created by a Congress that does not include the
state subject to the admission condition. And the newly admitted state’s lack
of representation in Congress may be a reason to more carefully scrutinize
the admission conditions imposed by Congress. Additionally, when Con-
gress enacts legislation to enforce a treaty, the topic and reach of such legis-
lation is limited by entities external to Congress—foreign states that must
consent to the treaty and that may not be as beholden to Congress as newly
admitted states are.122 Finally, there is an entirely different corpus of con-
gressional practice that speaks to the scope of Congress’s powers to execute
treaties, which some have suggested indicates that Congress may enact
treaty-related legislation that does not relate to Congress’s other delegated
powers.123
Although understanding equal sovereignty as a placeholder for other
limits on Congress’s powers explains the doctrine, congressional practice,
and constitutional text and structure reasonably well, it has very little to do
with “equality.” Rather, it rests on the idea that the Constitution limits Con-
gress to exercising its delegated powers and that the Constitution makes the
states sovereign and autonomous from the federal government in some
respects.
Analyzing the early equal sovereignty cases thus reveals equal sover-
eignty for what it was: a series of claims about what powers the Constitution
delegates to Congress and what spheres it reserves to the states. The “tradi-
tion” of equal sovereignty was largely invented in the course of deciding
distinct questions about federalism, and it shares several characteristics com-
mon to invented traditions. Referring to the tradition of equal sovereignty
allowed the Court to “establish[ ] [and] legitimize[ ] . . . [particular] rela-
tions of authority” between the state and federal governments.124 Equal sov-
ereignty was also created during a period of “rapid transformation”—the
admission of new states—that challenged then-prevailing “social patterns”
related to the proper spheres of federal and state authority.125 Courts used
the equal sovereignty principle to ward off these challenges, sometimes not-
ing that the process of admitting new states and the conditions attached to
122. States seeking admission may feel pressured to accept conditions in order to gain
admission. Cf. Robert W. Larson, New Mexico’s Quest for Statehood, 267–68 (1968)
(detailing the numerous conditions Congress imposed, and New Mexico accepted, as a prereq-
uisite to its admission); Onuf, supra note 69, at 67–87 (discussing Ohio’s unequal position in
relation to Congress in its quest for admission to the Union and the admission conditions
Congress accordingly imposed on it).
123. Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 59 (2014).
124. See Hobsbawm, supra note 29, at 9; see also supra text accompanying notes 27–28.
125. See Hobsbawm, supra note 29, at 4.
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new states’ admission posed unique challenges to commonly held ideas
about constitutional limits on Congress’s powers.126
That was the equal sovereignty principle, but it is not how Shelby
County used the equal sovereignty principle. There, the Court specifically
disclaimed ruling on whether the condition imposed on covered states—
preclearance—was constitutional. Part II examines whether Shelby County
was right to broaden the equal sovereignty doctrine beyond how it had been
used in prior cases.
II. Reinvention: State Equality as a Constitutional Norm
Recognizing equal sovereignty as a placeholder for limits on Congress’s
powers reveals that Shelby County made a change to the doctrine. Shelby
County explicitly stated that it had not determined that the VRA’s
preclearance regime exceeded the scope of Congress’s delegated powers or
violated any affirmative constraint on how Congress may regulate the states
(aside from the equal sovereignty principle).127 The Court “issue[d] no hold-
ing on § 5,” the provision actually requiring states to obtain federal approval
before enacting voting laws.128 Shelby County therefore did not use equal
sovereignty as prior cases had—that is to hold that a particular condition
may not be imposed on any state.
This Part argues that Shelby County was wrong to broaden the equal
sovereignty doctrine. There is little basis in the constitutional text or the
drafting history for any constitutional rule that requires Congress to treat
the states equally. And the equal sovereignty principle may also undermine
other principles that are embodied in the Constitution’s structure at a simi-
lar level of generality, such as federalism and nationalism. The equal sover-
eignty principle also conflicts with both longstanding congressional practice
and doctrine.
Moreover, even if the Constitution does embody some kind of rule that
Congress must treat the states equally, it is hard to say what, exactly, treating
states equally means. The equal sovereignty principle is derived from textual
and historical abstractions that are made at a fairly high level of generality.
Thus, neither text nor history provides much guidance on what the precise
126. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 566–68 (1911) (worrying about congressional pow-
ers becoming “uncontrollable by courts” if “the powers of Congress [were not] defined by the
Constitution alone”).
127. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). Shelby County would fit in
this category if the Court had concluded the VRA exceeded the scope of Congress’s power to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment because Congress had not identified a sufficiently serious
pattern of constitutional violations to justify imposing prophylactic legislation on the states.
See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 Election L.J. 329, 329–30
(2013) (interpreting Shelby County as suggesting that “Congress may employ a remedy like
preclearance only to reach the extreme Jim Crow variety [of unconstitutional conduct], but
not to address the more contained type of unconstitutional conduct we see today”). For rea-
sons why Shelby County should not be understood this way, see infra text accompanying notes
359–362.
128. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
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contours of the equal sovereignty principle might be. The relevant congres-
sional practice and case law, which are more concrete and specific than the
relevant text and history, fill in some of the details. But congressional prac-
tice and case law also highlight how difficult it is to define what it means to
treat the states equally. The myriad conceptions of what it might mean to
treat the states equally further illustrate why the contours of the equal sover-
eignty principle are so unclear.
A. Text
Courts and commentators have suggested that the constitutional text
implies some kind of equality among the states. Some cases suggest the
states are equal because the Constitution specifies several rights to which
each state is entitled (including representation in the Senate and full faith
and credit, among other things).129 Some scholars likewise trace the equal
sovereignty principle to provisions that require Congress to uniformly legis-
late in certain circumstances.130 Congress’s bankruptcy power, for example,
is limited to establishing “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States”;131 and Article IV, section 1 provides that Con-
gress “by general Laws” may “prescribe the Manner in which [state] Acts,
Records, and Proceedings shall be proved.”132 Some have also suggested that
other provisions, including the prohibition against making new states out of
old states and various references to the “union” of states,133 “embody state
equality concerns.”134
However, the textual arguments for the equal sovereignty principle are
not particularly compelling. For example, the text allotting two senators to
every state does not say anything about whether federal laws must treat the
states equally outside the context of Senate apportionment.135 And instead of
reflecting a general rule that Congress must treat the states equally, the
handful of explicit uniformity requirements applicable to certain congres-
sional powers support the opposite inference—that there is no general rule
129. See, e.g., Coyle, 221 U.S. at 567–68 (finding that the Guarantee Clause supports state
equality principle); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 3; id. art. IV; id. amend. X; Jack N. Rakove,
Original Meanings 170 (1999) (“[N]o one could deny that the Senate was intended to em-
body the equal sovereignty of the states . . . .”); Metzger, supra note 37, at 1518 (suggesting
Senate apportionment scheme and Article IV reflect state equality principles).
130. See Colby, supra note 37, at 301–23 (suggesting these provisions imply general uni-
formity constraint on other Article I powers); Metzger, supra note 37, at 1518 (suggesting “the
Effects Clause’s requirement that Congress act by means of ‘general laws’ ” “embod[ies] state
equality concerns”).
131. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (emphases added).
132. Id. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added).
133. See, e.g., Coyle, 221 U.S. at 566–67 (the word “union” implies equality among the
states).
134. Metzger, supra note 37, at 1518.
135. U.S. Const. art. I, § 3.
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requiring Congress to treat the states equally.136 Additionally, the other pur-
portedly relevant provisions of constitutional text, such as the New State
Clause and various references to the “union,” make no explicit mention of
state equality and are also equally—if not better—understood to reflect
other constitutional principles.137
Some textual provisions even admit the possibility of Congress impos-
ing different rules on different states. Article I, Section 9, for example, pro-
vides that “[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the
Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight.”138 This
provision seems to bar Congress, prior to 1808, from banning the foreign
slave trade in the original states; by implication, it suggests that prior to
1808, Congress could ban the foreign slave trade in states not yet in exis-
tence.139 Indeed, this is how both James Wilson140 and James Madison141 un-
derstood the provision.
Yet the textual argument against the state equality principle is not a slam
dunk either. There was little discussion of the significance of the phrase
“now existing” in Article I section 9.142 The specific mention of a power to
impose different rules on different states with respect to the foreign slave
136. See Price, supra note 19, at 27–28 (“The text of the Constitution, moreover, implies
the absence of a general principle of state equality by mandating some forms of equal treat-
ment but not others.”).
137. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitu-
tional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 249, 317 (1992) (arguing that the New
State Clause is about territoriality); Seinfeld, supra note 75, at 1085–86 (“[U]nion . . . mean[s]
the interest in binding the several states into a single political community.”).
138. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9 (emphasis added).
139. Earlier versions of the provision had provided that Congress may not prohibit the
importation of persons “as the sev[eral] States” thought proper to admit. 2 Farrand, supra
note 76, at 143; see also id. at 168–69, 183 (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid by the Legislature . . .
on the emigration or Importation of such Persons as the several States shall think proper to
admit; nor shall such emigration or Importation be prohibited.”). But the Committee of
Eleven reported out a provision that read “[t]he migration or importation of such persons as
the several States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited . . . .” Id. at
396.
140. 3 Farrand, supra note 76, at 160–61 (“[B]y this article, after the year 1808, the
Congress will have power to prohibit such importation, notwithstanding the disposition of any
State to the contrary. . . . And in the meantime, the new States which are to be formed will be
under the control of Congress in this particular, and slaves will never be introduced amongst
them.” (quoting James Wilson, Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 3, 1787))).
141. Id. at 436 (“Out of this conflict grew the middle measure providing that Congress
should not interfere until the year 1808; with an implication, that after that date, they might
prohibit the importation of slaves into the States then existing, & previous thereto, into the
States not then existing.” (quoting Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Nov. 27,
1819))).
142. When the provision was discussed, delegates often noted that Virginia, South Caro-
lina, or another state would not agree to a constitution that permitted Congress to immedi-
ately ban the foreign slave trade, see 2 Farrand, supra note 76, at 364–65, 371, or it was
discussed in terms that did not refer to the distinction between new and old states. Id. at
408–09.
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trade may imply the absence of a general power to impose different rules on
different states.143 There was also little discussion of the uniformity provi-
sions in Article I, which may weigh against reading a strong negative infer-
ence from them.144 And even if the explicit uniformity requirements in
Article I suggest that Congress is not generally required to treat all states the
same, that implication is weaker with respect to the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, which were added to the Constitution later.145
At bottom, the textual argument for the state equality principle is not
much worse than the textual support for other constitutional rules, espe-
cially ones associated with the Tenth Amendment.146 Because “[t]here is a[n]
. . . association between the Tenth Amendment and the general idea of state
sovereignty,” federalism- or state-sovereignty-preserving rules can “be classi-
fied as applications of the Tenth Amendment.”147 The same may be true for
equal sovereignty.
143. This inference, however, is not made elsewhere. For example, Article I Section 8
contains several clauses that appear to authorize Congress to enact criminal laws, but we do
not infer from this that Congress may not enact criminal laws pursuant to its other delegated
powers. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 6 (giving Congress the power to “provide for the
Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States”); id. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 10 (granting the power to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas”); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 135–36 (2010) (“[T]he Constitution,
which nowhere speaks explicitly about the creation of federal crimes beyond those related to
‘counterfeiting,’ ‘[t]reason,’ or ‘Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas’ or ‘against
the Law of Nations,’ nonetheless grants Congress broad authority to create such crimes.” (cita-
tions omitted)). Article I Section 9 referred to the foreign slave trade, which was understood to
be within Congress’s power to regulate under the Commerce Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. So, at a bare minimum, this suggests Article I, Section 9 recog-
nized Congress’s power to impose different rules on different states under the commerce
power. See supra notes 111–112 and accompanying text (discussing scope of commerce
power).
144. Cf. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2013) (“We have long held
that the expressio unius canon does not apply ‘unless it is fair to suppose that Congress consid-
ered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it.’ ” (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal
Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003))); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestand-
ing Federalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. F. 98, 102 (2009) (arguing that strong inferences should not
be made with regard to exclusivity because the founders expected the details of constitutional
federalism to work out over time).
145. See Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 486 (2008) (“ ‘[N]egative implications
raised by disparate provisions are strongest’ in those instances in which the relevant . . . provi-
sions were ‘considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was in-
serted.’ ” (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997))).
146. See John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 2003, 2020, 2029–40 (2009); Primus, supra note 33, at 1095–98.
Several theorists have more generally catalogued the ways in which the content of constitu-
tional law is not completely specified by the text. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 710–11 (1975); Primus, supra note 33, at
1106–13.
147. Primus, supra note 78, at 633; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905, 919
(1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to
the CLEOs’ challenge must be sought . . . in the structure of the Constitution [including the
Tenth Amendment] . . . .”); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1991) (the
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B. Original Meaning and History
If constitutional text is not dispositive, perhaps equal sovereignty can be
illuminated by or traced to the original public meaning of the Constitution.
But an analysis of the original meaning of the Constitution reveals no clear
understanding or expectation that the Constitution prohibits Congress from
distinguishing among the states.148 The sources often used by originalists—
the records of the Convention, the Federalist Papers, and other contempo-
rary writings indicative of public opinion—do not say much, if anything,
about whether federal law may impose different rules on different states.
They neither suggest Congress may distinguish among the states, nor that
Congress may not do so.149
anticommandeering principle “is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment”); cf.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 728 (1999) (“[T]he sovereign immunity of the States
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather . . . the
States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed
before the ratification of the Constitution . . . .”).
148. Originalists divide the methodology into (a) the “original public meaning” of the
Constitution, and (b) the expected applications about how the Constitution would operate.
Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional Re-
demption, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 147, 152 (2012) (book review) (summarizing these theories). Equal
sovereignty is probably either associated with the Tenth Amendment or implied by the general
structure of the Constitution. Because these provisions are framed at a high level of generality,
discerning their original public meaning involves some considerations of how contemporaries
expected a principle would apply. See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 Harv. L.
Rev. 2011, 2031–34 (2012) (book review). Subsequently disaggregating a principle’s public
meaning from its expected applications is therefore difficult. See id.; cf. Mitchell N. Berman,
Originalism and Its Discontents (Plus a Thought or Two About Abortion), 24 Const. Comment.
383, 393 (2007) (describing this difficultly with regard to original interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause); David A. Strauss, Can Originalism Be Saved?, 92 B.U. L. Rev. 1161,
1166–67 (2012) (noting that original public meaning theory can become a “black hole”).
Others identify in originalism a form of ethical argument whose force depends on whether an
historical narrative resonates with Americans’ identities. See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Integrating
Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Geo. L.J.
1765, 1803–06 (1997); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1 (2009). I
try to touch on these approaches in this section.
149. Thomas Colby has argued that it was originally understood that Congress was re-
quired to legislate uniformly under the Commerce Clause. Colby, supra note 37, at 263–65.
Colby maintains that the Port Preference Clause contains an implicit uniformity constraint on
the commerce power “because the Framers had a narrow conception of the scope of the com-
merce power” which “include[d] only the power to tax and regulate commercial shipping and
navigation between states. . . . [v]irtually all of [which] was conducted through ports.” Id. at
283–84 (footnote omitted). But it is unclear why we should assume the Port Preference Clause
was coextensive with and therefore implicitly constrains the commerce power. Originalists
who argue for a narrow interpretation of the Commerce Clause maintain that the power to
regulate commerce includes the power to regulate all forms of trade or exchange of goods and
commodities, not only trade or exchanges by port. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
585–87 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Consti-
tution: The Presumption of Liberty 280–88 (2004). Some of the historical evidence Colby
cites refers to the commerce power separately, and in more capacious terms, than the power
related to the regulation of ports. See Colby, supra note 37, at 283–84 (citing 3 Farrand, supra
note 76, at 116).
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In general, references to the equality of the states in the convention
records pertain to one specific issue—the formula for representation in the
federal legislature—rather than any general principle about when federal law
can distinguish among the states.150 And it would be a stretch to say that the
Senate apportionment scheme embodies some general principle that re-
quires any kind of equal treatment of the states.151 Most people agree the
Senate apportionment scheme reflects a compromise on the formula for
representation in the federal legislature, not agreement on any broad princi-
ple of state equality.152 The Senate apportionment scheme may, for example,
be attributable to the Convention’s voting rules, which required the consent
of state delegations.153 Any principle of structure embodied in the Senate
apportionment scheme is also qualified by the House of Representatives’
representation scheme, which treats each state according to one standard
(representation according to population) that authorizes different treatment
of different states.154 It may also be limited by the Seventeenth Amendment,
which severs the direct connection between the Senate and the states—the
Amendment makes senators popularly elected, rather than elected by state
legislatures.155
References to the equality of the states in the Federalist Papers are also
not especially informative.156 Colby, for example, cites a series of state-
ments—some from the Founding, others later in time—about how the
Union is a “confederation of States equal in sovereignty.”157 But none of
these statements speak to Congress’s power to vary from that principle; nor
do they delineate the spheres in which the states are equal sovereigns.158
150. See, e.g., 1 Farrand, supra note 76, at 167, 250–51, 324–25; 2 id. at 454.
151. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1964) (suggesting drafting history
of Senate apportionment scheme reflects a compromise between equal sovereignty and equal
representation by population).
152. See 1 Farrand, supra note 76, at 511 (representation issue threatened to “break up”
the Convention); id. at 321, 532; The Federalist No. 62, at 345 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (Senate representation is “evidently the result of compromise”); Bradford
R. Clark, Constitutional Compromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1421,
1426 (2008) (“[D]elegates from large states were forced to compromise and incorporate spe-
cific proposals favored by small states. . . . includ[ing] the basis for representation in the
Senate . . . .”).
153. Frances E. Lee & Bruce I. Oppenheimer, Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal
Consequences of Equal Representation 26–27 (1999).
154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; see also 1 Farrand, supra note 76 at 179, 321 (noting that
delegates thought that the House’s representation formula could disadvantage some states).
The Elections Clause, moreover, ensures that voting qualifications vary by state because it fixes
qualifications for voting in each state to “the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 2 cl. 1.
155. U.S. Const. amend. XVII; see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,
820–21 (1995).
156. See e.g., The Federalist No. 62 (James Madison).
157. See Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 36 & n.162) (quoting 35 Annals of Cong.
397 (1820) (statement of Sen. Pinkney)).
158. See id. at 36–42.
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There are also a number of contemporaneous statements that are critical of
the idea of equal sovereignty.159
Courts invoking equal sovereignty sometimes trace the principle to the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787,160 but the Ordinance’s meaning is unclear.
The Northwest Ordinance established a three-part progression toward state-
hood for certain territories and provided that new states would be admitted
on an “equal footing” “in all respects whatever” with the original states.161
However, “equal footing” did not necessarily promise new states the same
legislative sovereignty as the original states. The Northwest Ordinance was
passed while some delegates to the Constitutional Convention proposed to
restrict new states’ voting powers to ensure that newly admitted states could
never outvote the original states.162 One legal historian described these pro-
posals as “the political opposite of the ‘equal footing’ principle,” and sug-
gested the Ordinance drafters understood “equal footing” to mean new
states would receive fair representation in Congress.163 Additionally, the
Northwest Ordinance actually broadened Congress’s powers over the would-
159. In drafting debates, Madison maintained that “whatever reason might have existed
for the equality of suffrage [among the States] when the Union was a federal one among
sovereign States, it must cease when a national Govern[ment] should be put into the place.” 1
Farrand, supra note 76, at 37; see also 2 id. at 8–9. Others expressed similar concerns. 1 id. at
184 (“Brearly[ ] opposes the equality of Representation, alledges [sic] that although it is nu-
merically equal, yet in its operation it will be unequal . . . .”). And while the Senate eventually
gave each state equal representation, the House’s representation scheme differentiated between
the states.
With respect to subsequent congressional debates on admission conditions, numerous
congressional representatives defended Congress’s ability to impose different terms on differ-
ent states. See, e.g., 35 Annals of Cong. 280 (1820) (“Congress has “a right to prescribe the
terms” of a states’ admission “provided those terms are compatible with the Constitution, and
do not violate any of the essential rights of sovereignty.” (quoting Sen. Ruggles)); id. at 288–89
(the phrase “may be admitted” in the New State Clause “implies that Congress must exercise
their discretion. . . . limited [only] by the Federal Constitution, and . . . exercised in conform-
ity with its principles” (quoting Sen. Trimble)); id. at 281 (“[I]t had been the constant practice
of Congress to impose similar restrictions upon new States, when admitted into the Union. . . .
Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois . . . . were required to form their constitutions in conformity with
the ordinance of 1787.” (quoting Sen. Ruggles)); see also id. at 282–85.
160. See, e.g., Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222 (1845). The Ordinance
is sometimes viewed as a source of constitutional law. See id.; Onuf, supra note 69, at 133–53
(highlighting that contemporaries viewed Ordinance as constitutional); Denis P. Duffey, Note,
The Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 929 (1995). Courts
also sometimes trace the equal sovereignty principle to the state enabling acts, but these acts
imposed different conditions on different states. See supra text accompanying notes 55–67.
161. Onuf, supra note 69, at 62–64. Congress later ratified the Northwest Ordinance. Act
of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50.
162. 2 Farrand, supra note 76, at 3; Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh (Nov.
27, 1819) in 9 The Writings of James Madison 8 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“[I]t remains to
be decided how far the States formed within that Territory . . . are on a different footing from
its other members, as to their legislative sovereignty.”).
163. George William Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and
the Constitution in the Early American Republic 129, 155–56 (2010).
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be states, resulting in different treatment of those states.164 Whereas the 1784
Ordinance implied that new states would be “free to legislate on virtually
any subject other than war, peace, or monarchy,”165 the operative 1787 Ordi-
nance established “forever . . . unalterable” compacts prohibiting religious
discrimination and slavery in the new states, among other things.166 Madison
inferred from the Ordinance that it would be up to Congress to determine
whether newly admitted states would have the same “legislative sovereignty”
as the original states.167
C. Structure
Courts and commentators also sometimes infer the equal sovereignty
principle from the Constitution’s structure.168 Colby, for example, empha-
sizes constitutional structure in his defense of the equal sovereignty princi-
ple, describing the principle as part of the “very nature of our constitutional
compact.”169 And it is true that many constitutional rules are derived from
inferences about the Constitution’s structure.170 Many judicial decisions jus-
tify constitutional rules in terms of principles like federalism or nationalism,
which are inferred from the Constitution’s general structure and specific
provisions.171 Courts, for example, reason that the nationalist structure of
164. The 1784 Ordinance permitted settlers to establish a temporary government whereas
the 1787 Ordinance specified that the territory would be temporarily governed by a congres-
sionally appointed governor. Onuf, supra note 69, at 47, 60–61.
165. Van Cleve, supra note 163, at 155.
166. Onuf, supra note 69, at 62–64.
167. Letter from James Madison to Robert Walsh, supra note 162 (“[I]t remains to be
decided how far the States formed within that Territory . . . are on a different footing from its
other members, as to their legislative sovereignty.”).
168. See, e.g., Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911) (“[T]he constitutional equality of
the States is essential to the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which the Republic was
organized.”).
169. See Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 36–52).
170. See Manning, supra note 146, at 2004; Primus, supra note 33, at 1130 (“[T]he idea
that structure can be a valid nontextual source of constitutional rules enjoys widespread if
quiet acceptance . . . .”).
171. Some do so with respect to federalism. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
579 (1995) (“[T]here is widespread acceptance of our authority to enforce the dormant Com-
merce Clause, which we have but inferred from the constitutional structure . . . .”); Blatchford
v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitu-
tional structure which it confirms . . . .”); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 547 (1985) (“It is equally true, however, that the text of the Constitution provides the
beginning rather than the final answer to every inquiry into questions of federalism, for
‘[b]ehind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control.’ ”
(quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934))). Others do so with respect to
nationalism. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 385 (1819) (“The secur-
ity against abuse is to be found in the constitution and nature of the government, in its popu-
lar character and structure.”); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 343 (1816)
(“It is a mistake that the constitution was not designed to operate upon states, in their corpo-
rate capacities. It is crowded with provisions which restrain or annul the sovereignty of the
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the Constitution implicitly delegates powers to the federal government that
enable the federal government to serve nationalist ends.172 Relatedly, courts
reason that the Constitution’s federalist structure implicitly prohibits Con-
gress from regulating in ways that undermine the purposes of federalism.173
But not all structural inferences are created equal. And the structural case
for the equal sovereignty principle is especially weak, because equal sover-
eignty potentially undermines other principles that the Constitution embod-
ies at a similar level of generality, such as federalism and nationalism.174
1. Federalism
The equal sovereignty principle is potentially inconsistent with federal-
ism because equal sovereignty may undermine several of federalism’s key
goals. The standard benefits of federalism are well rehearsed: Federalism en-
ables local decisionmaking, which may be better informed about local
problems.175 It also may provide more opportunities for individual citizens
to engage in the governing process, perhaps making the process more demo-
cratic.176 Federalism also allows for more regulatory diversity, which may
satisfy the preferences of more citizens than uniform regulation can, because
like-minded citizens can aggregate together and select their preferred
rules.177 Regulatory diversity also may result in experimentation as different
jurisdictions try out different policies.178
states in some of the highest branches of their prerogatives.”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
419, 465 (1793) (Wilson, J.) (“Fair and conclusive deduction, then, evinces that the people of
the United States did vest this Court with jurisdiction over the State of Georgia.”); see also
Metzger, supra note 144, at 102–05.
172. See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory
of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 115–16 (2010) (“A federal constitution ideally gives
the central and state governments the power to do what each does best.”). The Court occa-
sionally invokes this kind of reasoning. E.g., United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 142–43
(2010) (construing federal custodial power based on assumption that federal government
could prevent “an interstate epidemic”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 413–24
(2003) (reasoning that the executive’s foreign affairs preemption power is based on benefits of
the president “speak[ing] for the Nation with one voice”).
173. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564 (rejecting government’s proposed interpretation of Com-
merce Clause because “it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power [in the the-
ory], even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States historically
have been sovereign”). In holding that Congress may not require state officers to enforce fed-
eral law, Printz openly weighed “the effect that federal control of state officers would have
upon” the states’ ability to provide “security” from the federal government. Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 922, 935 (1997).
174. See Manning, supra note 146, at 2055–58 (“[T]he Constitution’s structural provi-
sions reflect cross-cutting purposes.”).
175. Richard Briffault, “What About The ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Con-
temporary Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303, 1327–29 (1994).
176. Id.
177. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1484, 1493–94 (1987).
178. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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If we take seriously the claim that it is better for federalism when states
differ from one another, then prohibiting Congress from enacting laws that
specifically identify particular states or that impose regulations with differ-
ential effects on different states would be inconsistent with federalism.179 En-
suring different treatment of different states would provide a measure of
regulatory diversity, possibly satisfying the preferences of more citizens than
one uniform law could. Allocating different powers to different states would
also ensure some experimentation in regulatory policies. By differentiating
between the states, federal law may preserve many benefits of federalism
such as regulatory diversity, satisfaction of more citizens’ preferences, and
regulatory experimentation.
There are also reasons to embrace the possibility that these benefits of
federalism can be secured by federal law rather than by its absence. Today,
states often exercise lawmaking powers concurrently with the federal govern-
ment rather than in completely separate spheres.180 And in an era where
federal statutes cover a wide range of substantive areas, allowing those stat-
utes to differentiate among the states may be an essential mechanism for
preserving the benefits that flow from states differing from one another—
benefits originally associated with exclusive state regulation in substantive
areas.
Consider, for example, two statutes that authorize differential treatment
of different states. The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA) prohibits state-run gambling, except in states that had gambling
operations prior to the Act’s passage.181 The legislative history indicates these
“state exemptions” were intended to ensure the legislation would “not [ ]
interfere with existing laws, operations, or revenue streams.”182 A uniform
prohibition could have “threaten[ed] the economy of Nevada, which over
many decades ha[d] come to depend on legalized private gambling.”183
PASPA’s regulatory carve-outs thus respected local differences between the
states and, in doing so, preserved a measure of regulatory diversity and local
decisionmaking by allowing a handful of states to choose whether to retain
state-run gambling operations.
Similar to PASPA, the Clean Air Act (CAA) generally preempts state
vehicle-emissions standards, but it requires the EPA to more freely allow
California to adopt its own standards.184 Other States may choose to adopt
179. Cf. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580–88 (1985)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing state diversity is a beneficial end of federalism).
180. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 Yale L.J. 534 (2011) (dis-
cussing the growing number of federal schemes implemented by the states).
181. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704 (2012).
182. 138 Cong. Rec. 12,973 (1992).
183. 137 Cong. Rec. 256 (1991).
184. See Clean Air Act (CAA) § 209, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a)–(b)(1) (2012); see generally H.R.
Rep. No. 95-294, at 23 (1977) as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1101 (describing the
1977 CAA amendments and maintaining the unique authority of California to adopt and
enforce its own motor vehicle emission standards).
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either the EPA or California’s vehicle-emissions standard.185 The CAA’s leg-
islative history shows that Congress recognized California’s unique history
of developing rigorous vehicle-emissions regulations.186 By permitting Cali-
fornia to more freely develop its own vehicle-emission standards and al-
lowing other states to select between the California and federal standards,
the CAA allows for more local decisionmaking and more diverse vehicle-
emissions standards than a uniform federal rule.187
A uniformity requirement on federal law may also undermine federal-
ism by maximizing the number of states subject to federal direction. If Con-
gress is limited to choosing between legislation that establishes one uniform
federal standard or no federal legislation at all, which permits each state to
develop its own standard (possibly resulting in fifty different standards),
Congress may choose to establish one uniform standard that limits all the
states. In the CAA, for example, Congress could have reasonably concluded
that fifty different vehicle-emissions standards were too many but that the
automobile industry could tolerate two different standards.
2. Nationalism
Treating some states differently from others also furthers values associ-
ated with nationalism. The benefits and purposes of nationalism may in-
clude, among other things, having a federal government that is capable of
effectively exercising those powers delegated to it, as well as unity, cohesion,
and coordination.188
Differentiating between the states furthers the purposes of nationalism,
because it provides a useful regulatory tool that enables the federal govern-
ment to effectively exercise its delegated powers.189 There are often differ-
ences between the states that call for different treatment. A federal oil tax,
for example, exempted oil that was produced in “a well located north of the
Arctic Circle” or “a well located on the northerly side of the divide of the
Alaska-Aleutian Range.”190 Alaska’s “fragile ecology, [ ] harsh environment,
and [ ] remote location” may have made Alaskan oil more expensive to pro-
duce, and by reducing the taxes applicable to that oil, the tax exemption
185. 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
186. Air Pollution and Alternative Fuels, Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 101st Cong. 5–6 (1989) (statement of Cal. State Assemb. Byron Sher); S. Rep. No.
101-228, at 45–46 (1989), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3431–32.
187. Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1097,
1110 (2009).
188. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 172, at 117; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of
Federal Courts Law, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1141, 1158–63 (1988) (describing nationalist premises of
federal courts doctrines); Seinfeld, supra note 75, at 1085–86.
189. Another way of framing this argument is that, because Congress’s powers are plenary
in fields in which it may regulate, it should be able to specify which states exercise which
lawmaking powers within that domain. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 423,
434 (1946).
190. 26 U.S.C. §§ 4991(b), 4994(e) (1976) (repealed 1988).
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accounted for the higher cost of producing Alaskan oil.191 Federal law also
requires only “the States of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington” to ad-
vise the federal government about laws and regulations pertaining to
salmon.192 There are geographic reasons why those states—but not, for ex-
ample, Oklahoma—should advise the federal government about laws relat-
ing to salmon.193
Differences between the states may also call for different treatment even
where the differences are attributable to the state’s laws or policies. The
states sometimes differ from one another because they choose to pursue
different policies. And, in some cases, there will be some continuity with
respect to which states pursue which policies. Political theories about feder-
alism assume that citizens choose to associate with states based on the poli-
cies a state has previously chosen to pursue; this may cause states to pursue
the same policies as they have done in the past.194
Treating some states differently than others may further other values
associated with nationalism, such as limiting disunity among the states. For
example, federal law allows “[t]he State[s] of South Carolina” and “Nevada”
to “limit the volume of low-level radioactive waste accepted for disposal . . .
to a total of 8,400,000 cubic feet” and “1,400,000 cubic feet” respectively.195
Doing so prohibits other states from using South Carolina and Nevada as
dump sites. Exempting states from otherwise applicable federal require-
ments, as in PASPA, may also benefit the federal structure more than an
unyielding requirement that attempts to impose one rule on all the states.196
While the Constitution may refer to the states collectively, that does not
justify an inference that Congress is required to treat all of the states the
same. Part of Colby’s structural argument for the equal sovereignty principle
is that the Constitution was ratified against a “backdrop understanding” of
equal sovereignty that was “drawn from European notions of international
law.”197 But states in the Union are not sovereign in the same way that inter-
national states are sovereign; indeed, they differ in ways that speak to the
191. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 78, 85 (1983).
192. 16 U.S.C. § 3635 (2012).
193. See id.
194. See Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc.
Sci. 66, 71–72 (2001); see also Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double
Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75, 136–39, 157–58 (2001) (noting that a “classic
argument[ ] for federalism” is that people can “accommodate their own preferences by voting
with their feet” and migrate to states that share their political preferences); Ernest A. Young,
The Volk of New Jersey? State Identity, Distinctiveness, and Political Culture in the American
Federal System 66–105 (Duke Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2015-11, Feb. 24,
2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2552866 [http://perma.cc/8CPQ-DKTR].
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(b) (2012).
196. Thus, while Colby maintains that the equal sovereignty principle functions as a
means for “generating unity,” sometimes it may do the opposite. Colby, supra note 32 (manu-
script at 47–48).
197. Id. (manuscript at 50, 52). Colby also maintains that “equal sovereignty is an essen-
tial, implicit structural component of virtually any federalist system.” Id. (manuscript at 46).
But federalist systems vary in many different ways, and it is hard to maintain that any one
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relevance of the international law version of the equal sovereignty principle.
The international law version of the equal sovereignty principle maintains
that all states are on an equal playing field because no one state or lawmak-
ing body is superior to another.198 But that premise does not hold for states
in the Union. Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law is supreme, and
states are subject to federal law.199 The federal government thus occupies a
position with respect to states in the Union that does not exist in interna-
tional law. And this means the key premise of the international law version
of the equal sovereignty principle—that there is no hierarchy among
lawmakers on the international field—does not apply to states in the
Union.200 Moreover, the contours of the equal sovereignty principle in inter-
national law do not obviously support a domestic analog that requires Con-
gress to treat all states the same.201 Under international law, equal
sovereignty merely gives all foreign states the legal capacity to make interna-
tional law and to be recognized by other states as states.202 This articulation
of the equal sovereignty principle more closely resembles the theory that
equal sovereignty means that all states in the Union possess the constitution-
ally essential attributes of statehood, whatever those may be.203
attribute is the essence of a federal system. Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Feder-
alism and Transnational Judicial Discourse, 2 Int’l J. Const. L. 91, 104–05 (2004); Manning,
supra note 146, at 2061; cf. Leah M. Litman, Structural Outliers: The Role of Historical Novelty
in Constitutional Structure 66 Duke L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author) (arguing that
a statute’s novelty is not a sign that it is unconstitutional on constitutional federalism
grounds).
198. Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International
Organization, 53 Yale L.J. 207, 208–09 (1944); Ulrich K. Preub, Equality of States—Its Mean-
ing in a Constitutionalized Global Order, 9 Chi. J. Int’l L. 17, 23–26 (2008).
199. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See generally Evan H.
Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Im-
plement Federal Law?, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1001, 1034–42 (1995).
200. See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law
448–49 (8th ed. 2012) (“A corollary of their independence is the equality of states, historically
expressed by the maxim par in parem non habet imperium.” (footnote omitted)); 1 Oppen-
heim’s International Law 339 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (“[T]he
member states of the international community are equal to each other as subjects of interna-
tional law.”).
201. Today, the international law principle of equal sovereignty is also riddled with excep-
tions—different states exercise different lawmaking powers in different international bodies,
and the principle has “waning effectiveness as a shield from external intervention.” Gabriella
Blum, The Crime and Punishment of States, 38 Yale J. Int’l L. 57, 104 (2013); see also Preub,
supra note 198, at 25–26.
202. See sources cited supra note 198.
203. See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911) (“ ‘This Union’ was and is a union of
States . . . each competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution itself.”).
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D. Congressional Practice
In part because the meaning of the constitutional text, history, and
structure are ambiguous, a useful measure of the constitutional validity of
the equal sovereignty principle is its “descriptive accuracy,”204 meaning
whether the principle describes or fits with most congressional practice.205 A
congressional history of treating some states differently than others bears on
the legitimacy and scope of the equal sovereignty principle, because it en-
gages with the Court’s own justification for the equal sovereignty princi-
ple—the purported “historic tradition that all the States enjoy equal
sovereignty.”206 Because the Court’s account of equal sovereignty rested on
tradition and convention, we should feel comfortable eliminating accounts
of the equal sovereignty principle that depart too far from congressional
practice.207 Congressional statutes may also offer more specific evidence on
the scope of the equal sovereignty principle, at least compared to the high-
level abstractions and inferences that are made from the Constitution’s text,
history, and structure.
The reality is that Congress has frequently enacted both laws that specif-
ically identify particular states and laws that result in differential effects on
different states.208 And it has done so for a very long time.209 Statutes passed
in the first and second Congresses regulated merchandise reports for ships
204. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189, 1203, 1233 (1987).
205. Id.; see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 Calif.
L. Rev. 535, 540–41 (1999).
206. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2621 (2013) (quoting NAMUDNO, 557
U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
207. There may also be independent reasons for why the validity of a constitutional inter-
pretation should be measured in part by congressional practice. See David A. Strauss, What Is
Constitutional Theory?, 87 Calif. L. Rev. 581, 582 (1999) (“[A theory] cannot call for a whole-
sale departure from existing practices.”). Some of these reasons range from legitimacy, see
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the Lens of Hartian Positivist
Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1107, 1112–13 (2008), to rule of law values, see Richard A.
Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 165, 178 (2008), to judi-
cial humility, see Leah M. Litman, Taking Care of Federal Law, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1289, 1339
(2015).
208. The Shelby County dissent intimated that Congress frequently distinguishes among
the states. 133 S. Ct. at 2649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Federal statutes that treat states dispa-
rately are hardly novelties.”). But the Court and commentators have identified only a handful
of relatively recent laws differentiating between the states. E.g., id. (listing PASPA, cooperative
spending formulas, and designation of Yucca Mountain); Price, supra note 19, at 29 n.26 (ad-
ditionally listing Clean Air Act, federal housing assistance requirement, and 1806 statute).
209. Evidence of early congressional practice may also serve as evidence of original mean-
ing. See Michael Bhargava, The First Congress Canon and the Supreme Court’s Use of History, 94
Calif. L. Rev. 1745, 1746–47 (2006).
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by establishing different reporting requirements for ships that docked in dif-
ferent states.210 Statutes granted authority to federal officials to issue trans-
portation permits and the federal officials’ authority varied by state;211 the
payment of federal judges also varied by state.212 Statutes passed in the early
1800s also differentiated between the states by granting jurisdiction over cer-
tain federal revenue offenses only to certain state courts213 and by allocating
federal money or federal improvements to particular states.214
Beyond these historical examples, many statutes today specifically iden-
tify particular states for differential treatment or adopt a rule that has differ-
ential effects on different states. Consider the following laws (some of which
have already been discussed):
• Some federal laws impose limits on states’ lawmaking powers while ex-
empting particular states, or categories of states, from federal regulation.
° PASPA prohibits state-run gambling unless state gambling “was au-
thorized by a statute” and “actually was conducted” prior to October
1991.215 Federal law prohibited states from imposing taxes on internet
access between 1998 and 2001 unless, before 1998, “a State . . . gener-
ally collected such tax on charges for Internet access.”216
° In the area of commercial driving regulation, federal law establishes
“[s]pecial rules for Wyoming, Ohio, Alaska, Iowa, and Nebraska.”217
“Ohio may allow the operation of commercial motor vehicle combina-
tions with 3 property-carrying units of 28.5 feet each,” but other states
210. 1 Laws of the United States of America, ch. 35, § 20, 199–200 (1796) (specifying that
each shipmaster had “twenty-four hours after the arrival” of the ship to make the report
“except in the state of Georgia, where such report shall be made within forty-eight hours”).
211. Id. at 185–86. Congress specified that the collector of Pennsylvania could grant per-
mits for transportation of goods to and from New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland;
the collector of New York could grant similar permits across New Jersey; and the collector of
Maryland or Virginia could grant permits for transportation across Delaware and Penn-
sylvania. This resulted in greater limits on some states’ lawmaking powers, because federal
officials’ determinations occasionally preempted or displaced contrary state law. E.g., Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
212. 1 Laws of the United States of America, ch. 17, 45 (1796). The judge for the district
of Maine received $1,000; the judge for the district of Massachusetts received $1,200. Id.
213. See Act of Mar. 8, 1806, ch. 14, 2 Stat. 354, 354 (granting jurisdiction to certain New
York and Pennsylvania state courts); see also Act of Apr. 21, 1808, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 489 (reaffirm-
ing 1806 statute and extending the same jurisdiction to certain courts in Ohio).
214. Feller, supra note 69, at 51; see also Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution:
Federalism in the Long Founding Moment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 397, 409–10 (2015) (discussing the
passing of internal improvement legislation and how many of these bills were specific to cer-
tain states).
215. 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012). The legislative history of the statute recognized the exemp-
tion was intended to and would allow state-run gambling only in Oregon, Nevada, and Dela-
ware. See S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 9–10 (1991).
216. Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-227, § 1101(a)–(d), 112 Stat. 2681, 2719
(1998).
217. 49 U.S.C. § 31112(c) (2012).
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may not.218 And, unlike other states, “Nebraska may allow the opera-
tion of a truck tractor and 2 trailers or semitrailers not in actual lawful
operation on a regular or periodic basis on June 1, 1991.”219
° All states except for California that seek to obtain a waiver from the
EPA’s preemption provisions bear the burden of proof to show that
their emission standards are at least as protective as the federal stan-
dards. But California may adopt its own vehicle-emission standards
unless the EPA shows that California’s standards are not equally pro-
tective of public health.220
° The Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA) preempts
all state laws that “relate to any employee benefit plan,”221 but exempts
from that provision “the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act” or subse-
quent amendments to the Act.222
° Federal housing law generally requires entities administering federal
housing assistance “to include a resident of public housing or a recipi-
ent of assistance.”223 But “the Housing Authority of the county of Los
Angeles, California and [of] the States of Alaska, Iowa, and Missis-
sippi” are exempt from this requirement.224
• Some federal laws empower particular states to do things others cannot
do.
° Federal law allows “[t]he State of South Carolina . . . [to] limit the
volume of low-level radioactive waste accepted for disposal . . . to a
total of 8,400,000 cubic feet.”225 Federal law also contains state-specific
provisions for Washington and Nevada.226
° Congress frequently signs off on interstate compacts, making federal
laws that apply only to particular states.227
• Some federal laws establish programs that are limited to particular states.
° Federal law requires only “the States of Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and
Washington” to advise the federal government about laws and regula-
tions pertaining to salmon.228
218. Id. § 31112(c)(2).
219. Id. § 31112(c)(5).
220. Clean Air Act § 209, 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (2012); see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 23
(1977) (discussing California’s “broad discretion” in the emissions waiver context).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012).
222. Id. § 1144(b)(5)(A).
223. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-55,
§ 211, 125 Stat. 552, 695 (2011).
224. Id.; see also Price, supra note 19, at 29 n.26.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(b)(1) (2012).
226. Id. § 2021e(b)(2)–(3).
227. See, e.g., Red River Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-564, 94 Stat. 3305 (1980) (allocating
water rights among the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas); Tarrant Reg’l
Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120 (2013) (interpreting the Red River Compact).
228. 16 U.S.C. § 3635 (2012).
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° Federal law authorizes the Secretary of Energy to operate a home-heat-
ing oil reserve in and for “the States of Maine, New Hampshire, Ver-
mont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.”229
• Federal law gives benefits to some states but not others, or gives different
packages of benefits to different states.
° Federal law establishes differing Medicare payments—the amount that
hospitals, including state-run hospitals, are reimbursed for medical ex-
penses—for different states. “[F]rontier States,” meaning states in
which at least half of the counties have a population of less than six
individuals per square mile, are reimbursed at a different rate than
nonfrontier states.230 Other cooperative-spending programs contain
similar formulas that are also tied to population and that result in dif-
ferent treatment of different states231 or that single out particular re-
gions for different treatment.232
° Federal law provides for a litany of tax benefits for various “bond[s]
. . . issued by the State of Alabama, Louisiana, or Mississippi” or
projects or loans initiated by those states.233
° Spending programs condition a state’s receipt of federal money on the
state complying with terms specified by federal law. But the programs
also authorize federal agencies to waive the terms for some states but
not others. These states that received waivers may receive federal
money even though they are not required to comply with the same
terms applied to other states.234
° Federal spending provisions frequently contain earmarks for particular
states.235 In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Congress earmarked bil-
lions of dollars for Louisiana and Mississippi.236
• Federal laws treat states differently in other ways as well.
229. 42 U.S.C. § 6250. For other examples, see 26 U.S.C. § 143(l) (2012), 40 U.S.C.
§§ 17702–08 (2012), and 43 U.S.C. § 390g (2012).
230. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-4(e)(1)(I), 1395ww(3)(E)(iii).
231. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3796bb, 13925, 13971.
232. 40 U.S.C. § 14502.
233. 26 U.S.C. § 1400N.
234. See 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2012); 40 U.S.C. § 14502(d)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 1315; see also
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in The Health Care
Case 227, 228 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013).
235. E.g., Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-77, 125 Stat. 1277,
1277 (2011); Joshua Bone, Stop Ignoring Pork and Potholes: Election Law and Constituent Ser-
vice, 123 Yale L.J. 1406, 1417 n.42 (2014); Price, supra note 19, at 28.
236. E.g., Cong. Budget Office, The Federal Government’s Spending and Tax Ac-
tions in Response to the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, at 1–2 (2007), https://
www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/110th-congress-2007-2008/reports/08-07-hurri-
canes_letter_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/UJ22-4DC4]; see also Matt Fellowes & Amy Liu, The
Brookings Institution, Federal Allocations in Response to Katrina, Rita, and
Wilma: An Update (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2006/8/
metropolitanpolicy%20fellowes/20060712_katrinafactsheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/82YC-6TCR].
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° Congress designated an area in Nevada, Yucca Mountain, as a site for
high-level radioactive waste, allocated funds for the project, and im-
posed obligations on Nevada related to the designation.237 Congress
also allowed the president to designate other areas as radioactive-waste
sites, which would trigger a similar set of benefits and obligations on
states with designated sites.238
° The Agricultural Adjustment Act established state quotas for crop
production.239
Unlike the constitutional text and history, congressional practice pro-
vides evidence not only about whether equal sovereignty should be thought
of as a constitutional rule, but also about what its contours might be. Given
the relevant congressional practice, it is hard to defend the idea that Con-
gress may not regulate in ways that have differential effects on different
states or specifically identify particular states when legislating.
The equal sovereignty principle could be narrowly defined, for example,
only to apply to laws that have differential effects on different states’ law-
making powers, as opposed to laws that treat private individuals differently
by virtue of the fact that those individuals are in different states.240 That is, it
might be the case that federal law could penalize an individual for jaywalk-
ing in State A but not State B. But federal law could not allow State A to
legalize jaywalking, but forbid State B from legalizing jaywalking. Indeed,
this is how both Colby and Schmitt define the equal sovereignty principle:
“It is a guarantee of equal sovereignty,”241 which, to them, means that every
state must have the same “independent authority and . . . right to govern.”242
They therefore maintain that the equal sovereignty principle is not con-
cerned with laws framed in geographic terms that merely affect some states
more than others, such as federal spending laws or laws that merely regulate
federal property that happens to be in particular states.243
But many of the aforementioned statutes curtail or expand some states’
lawmaking authority more than others and, in doing so, differentially affect
different states’ ability to govern. PASPA, ERISA, CAA, commercial-driving
237. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10133, 10136, 10137.
238. Id. § 10136.
239. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1344(b) (2012) (apportioning the national acreage allotment
among states proportionate to their historical production levels).
240. The phrase “equal footing” or “political . . . sovereignty” could imply this limitation.
See United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950) (emphases added).
241. Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 59).
242. Id. (quoting Sovereignty, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/sovereignty [http://perma.cc/JGH4-MQUX]); Schmitt, supra note 32 (manuscript at
12–13) (“supreme dominion, authority, or rule” (quoting Sovereignty, Black’s Law Diction-
ary (9th ed. 2009))); id. (manuscript at 14) (“The only category of federal legislation that
violates the equal sovereignty principle, therefore, is legislation that prohibits a select number
of states—but not others—from passing certain types of regulations.”); accord Brader, supra
note 37, at 155–56 (defining equal sovereignty principle this way).
243. Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 62–63); Schmitt, supra note 32 (manuscript at
13).
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restrictions, and waste-removal provisions all allow some states to make laws
that others cannot. The same is true for provisions that impose staffing re-
quirements on only some state administrative bodies; through these require-
ments, such provisions remove from those states the authority to govern
themselves by other means.244
Laws that are framed in “geographic” terms will also differentially affect
states’ regulatory authority by virtue of the doctrine of preemption. Some
Surface Mining Act provisions establish different requirements for mining
operations in “prime farmland.”245 Because some states have more “prime
farmland” than others, the law limited some states’ lawmaking powers more
than others. For example, where the more stringent Surface Mining Act pro-
visions applied, a state was precluded from adopting the more lenient land-
use regulations that other states with less prime farmland could adopt.
For similar reasons, laws that purport to regulate federal property will
have differential effects on different states’ lawmaking authority. The power
to regulate federal property allows Congress to impose regulations that apply
outside the formal boundaries of federal property.246 More importantly, fed-
eral laws enacted pursuant to Congress’s power to regulate federal property
may preempt state law.247 Thus, by prohibiting certain conduct on federal
public lands (or lands adjacent to those lands), federal law may preclude a
state from adopting a policy that permits that conduct—meaning that a
state cannot go below whatever floor is established by federal law.248 Under
244. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1099 (2005)
(describing differences in governance structures as one kind of regulatory diversity); Douglas
Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure
of Constitutional Rights, 99 Yale L.J. 1711, 1733 (1990) (book review) (“It is not difficult to
understand the state’s interest in controlling the relationship between itself and its
employees . . . .”).
245. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
246. See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 546 (1976) (“[I]t is clear that regulations
under the Property Clause may have some effect on private lands not otherwise under federal
control.”); United States v. Alford, 274 U.S. 264, 267 (1926) (“Congress may prohibit the
doing of acts upon privately owned lands that imperil the publicly owned forests.”); Camfield
v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
247. Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543 (“Absent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains juris-
diction over federal lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to
enact legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause. And when Congress
so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy
Clause.” (citations omitted)); see id. at 545 (“The Act . . . overrides the New Mexico Estray
Law.”).
248. Some federal property regulations target all federal lands and thus will impose
greater restrictions on states in which there are more federally held lands. See, e.g., S.D. Mining
Ass’n v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding county law preempted
under mining regulations imposed on federal land); N.M. State Game Comm’n v. Udall, 410
F.2d 1197, 1201–02 (10th Cir. 1969) (determining that the National Park Service can remove
deer from national park without seeking permit as required by state law); cf. United States v.
Lindsey, 595 F.2d 5, 6 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (finding individuals on state property
could be convicted of building a fire without permits because state property was adjacent to
federal land); United States v. Allen, 578 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Congress, in the
exercise of this authority, has enacted legislation reserving to the United States the right to
1248 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1207
ordinary principles of conflict preemption, states may not enact laws that
conflict with the purposes and objectives of federal law, and therefore a law
that varies by state or only applies in particular states will differentially affect
states’ lawmaking powers.249
More generally, defining the equal sovereignty principle so narrowly un-
dermines the idea that there is any deep structural, constitutional commit-
ment to equal sovereignty.250 Once we acknowledge that the federal
government may regulate in ways that have differential effects on different
states’ lawmaking powers251 or spend its money so as to expand some states’
regulatory options more than others252 or impose restrictions on federal
property that affect what regulations different state can impose,253 then equal
sovereignty looks less and less like a core commitment or deep structural
truth about our constitutional system.
E. Doctrine
The Court has also frequently upheld federal statutes that result in dif-
ferent treatment of different states, as well as statutes that specifically iden-
tify particular states.254 Furthermore, the cases interpreting the uniformity
manage vegetative surface resources on an unpatented claim and specifically stating that any
mining claims (such as the Allens’) ‘shall not be used . . . for any purposes other than pros-
pecting, mining or processing operations and uses reasonably incident thereto.’ ” (quoting 30
U.S.C. § 612 (1970))); United States v. Brown, 552 F.2d 817, 822–23 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he
regulations prohibiting hunting and possession of a loaded firearm were promulgated pursu-
ant to that authority, and are valid prescriptions designed to promote the purposes of the
federal lands within the national park. Under the Supremacy Clause the federal law overrides
the conflicting state law allowing hunting within the park.” (footnote omitted) (citations omit-
ted)). Other times federal laws regulate particular federal properties, which will differentially
affect the states in which those federal properties are located. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Block, 660
F.2d 1240, 1252 (8th Cir. 1981) (rejecting challenge to regulation of federal property that
limited state authority over boundary waters because “[t]his authority, like any other state
police power, however, must yield to any valid exercise of federal power”); Ventura County v.
Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 1080, 1083 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding local ordinances purporting to
require a private energy developer on federal land to obtain a use permit preempted under
lease entered into under federal Mineral Leasings Act enacted pursuant to Property Clause);
Brubaker v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 652 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Colo. 1982) (finding that the El Paso
County Board of Commissioners was precluded from refusing to grant a special use permit for
drilling operations on federal land because the operations had already been approved by the
federal government).
249. See Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 581 (1987) (applying
conflict preemption principles to law enacted under property power); Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 546
(finding state law preempted under law enacted pursuant to property power).
250. I explore this argument more in depth in Structural Outliers: The Role of Historical
Novelty in Constitutional Structure. Litman, supra note 197 (manuscript at 40–52).
251. Colby, supra note 32 (manuscript at 60).
252. Id. (manuscript at 61–62).
253. Id. (manuscript at 60).
254. Federal courts rejected numerous equal sovereignty challenges prior to Shelby
County. See Nuclear Energy Inst. v. EPA, 373 F.3d 1251, 1303–09 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (per
curiam) (rejecting an equal sovereignty challenge to the choice of the Yucca Mountain site);
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provisions applicable to various congressional powers—provisions that re-
quire Congress, in certain circumstances, to legislate “uniform[ly] through-
out the United States”—reflect different conceptions of what it means to
treat the states equally.255
1. Upholding Laws Distinguishing Among the States
The Court has upheld several laws enacted under the Commerce Clause
that result in differential effects on different states. Hodel v. Indiana, for
example, upheld the Surface Mining Act provisions that established different
requirements for mining operations in “prime farmland.”256 Because the
states had different amounts of “prime farmland,” the extent to which land
in each state was subject to more stringent land-use requirements varied.257
Hodel upheld the provisions, reasoning that “[a] claim of arbitrariness can-
not rest solely on a statute’s lack of uniform geographic impact.”258
Even in cases where the Constitution explicitly requires federal law to be
uniform, the Court has upheld laws that result in differential effects on dif-
ferent states. United States v. Ptasynski upheld the previously mentioned oil
tax that exempted oil produced through “a well located north of the Arctic
Circle.”259 And Hanover National Bank v. Moyses held that federal bank-
ruptcy law was uniform because it applied one general standard to all the
states, even though that standard resulted in treatment that varied by
state.260 Federal bankruptcy law incorporated state law to define the content
of the bankruptcy estate such that whether a person’s property was part of
the bankruptcy estate varied by state: the same type of property might be
part of the bankruptcy estate in State A, but not State B.261
The Court has also upheld laws that specifically identify particular
states, even in cases where the Constitution explicitly requires federal law to
United States v. Gardner, 107 F.3d 1314, 1318–19 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting challenge to fed-
eral government’s claim to public lands in Nevada); Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1555 (9th
Cir. 1990) (rejecting equal sovereignty challenge to Yucca Mountain site designation); Potter v.
Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1067–68 (10th Cir. 1985) (rejecting challenge to condition that
Utah ban polygamy); Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 958 F. Supp. 1501, 1512–14 (D.
Colo. 1997) (rejecting challenge to conditions on Colorado’s use of certain lands).
255. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
256. 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
257. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 332–33. Another example is Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig
Refining Co., which upheld the Sugar Act of 1948’s quotas for how much sugar could be
produced in different regions. 338 U.S. 604 (1950). Noting that the law established “geo-
graphic” quotas, the Roig Court explained, “[s]uffice it to say that since Congress fixed the
quotas on a historical basis it is not for this Court to reweigh the relevant factors . . . .” Roig,
358 U.S. at 618.
258. 452 U.S. at 332; see also Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388–89 (1946) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 14 (1939).
259. 462 U.S. 74, 77, 85 (1983) (quoting 26 U.S.C. §§ 4991(b), 4994(e) (Supp. V 1976)
(repealed 1988)).
260. 186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).
261. Id. at 189–90.
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be uniform. Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. upheld a law
that established bankruptcy reorganization procedures for railroads within
the “States of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecti-
cut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Mary-
land, Virginia, West Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois.”262
Blanchette maintained there was “flexibility inherent” in the uniformity re-
quirement, which allows Congress to “take into account differences that ex-
ist between different parts of the country.”263
2. Revisiting What Equal Treatment Means
The uniformity cases bring us back to the idea that it is difficult to
define what it means to treat the states equally. There are several possible
accounts of what it means to treat the states “equally,” and indeed, different
cases reflect different conceptions of what treating the states equally means.
Some cases interpreting the scope of Congress’s bankruptcy or tax powers,
such as Moyses, maintained that “equal treatment” means subjecting all the
states to one standard that does not specifically identify particular states.264
Treating the states equally, in other words, meant adopting a formally uni-
form standard, even if that standard results in different treatment of differ-
ent states. Ptasynski, by contrast, appeared to embrace the idea that treating
the states equally means not regulating with an impermissible purpose, inti-
mating that laws framed in “geographic” terms are invalid only when moti-
vated by “geographic discrimination.”265
Neither of these principles is necessarily a better definition of what it
means for federal law to treat states equally. For one thing, the idea that the
Constitution only requires Congress not to specifically identify particular
states may be too formalistic.266 Certain aspects of the VRA, for example,
looked like Congress had treated some states differently than others: the cov-
erage formula was designed to differentiate between the states, and, by se-
lecting a coverage formula, Congress knew which states would be treated
differently.267 And a rule prohibiting Congress from specifically identifying
particular states would not be implicated by, for example, a law that applied
only north of a certain latitude. That standard does not mention the names
of particular states, though it defines the law’s scope to include some states
but not others.
A rule prohibiting Congress from specifically identifying particular
states also may not cover other occasions where it seems unequal for the
262. 419 U.S. 102, 108 & n.2 (1974) (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 702(13) (Supp. III 1970)).
263. Id. at 158–59.
264. See, e.g., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 86 (1900); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S.
580, 594 (1884).
265. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 85 (1983).
266. Cf. Primus, supra note 38, at 509 (“A better understanding, however, is that the
doctrine of express classifications is not in practice about formal statutory language.”).
267. See infra text accompanying notes 353–355.
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federal government to formally treat all states the same. One water law
scholar has argued that it would violate the equality of the states to apply the
prior appropriation doctrine to interstate water disputes.268 Under the prior
appropriation doctrine, a later-in-time claim to water use cannot defeat ear-
lier claims; the first person to use water establishes her right to the water and
also limits any subsequent person’s use of the water, because subsequent
users cannot interfere with how the first person used the water.269 Applying
the prior appropriation doctrine to all states formally treats states the same.
But doing so arguably results in unfair disparities between the states, because
western states’ water rights will always be limited by how earlier-admitted
states used those waters.270 The western states would have no claim to equal
amounts of water, or to an amount of water proportionate to their size; they
would have a claim only to the amount of water that would not interfere
with earlier states’ use of that water.
A rule prohibiting Congress from specifically identifying particular
states may also be too broad. Congress may formally identify particular
states in order to equalize the playing field among the states. For example,
the United States acquired land that formed different states in different
ways.271 Some justices maintained that, in light of these differences, the fed-
eral government had to treat the new states differently in order to treat them
equally:
[Because] [v]ast tracts within the boundaries of the [new] State belonged
to the Federal Government. . . . the new State’s potential revenue base
would be restricted severely unless the Federal Government waived its im-
munity from taxation. In order to place Ohio on an equal footing with the
original States, Congress . . . . granted the State a fixed proportion of the
lands within its borders for the support of public education.272
A rule prohibiting Congress from imposing regulations that have differ-
ential effects on different states may also be too broad. In cooperative spend-
ing programs, for example, federal transportation programs provide
different states with different amounts of money depending on the number
of highways in each state in order to allow each state to repair all of its
highways.273 If federal law instead gave each state $2 million dollars, some
states would be able to repair all of their highways but other states would
not.
Nor is it clear that treating the states equally means not regulating for
the purpose of disadvantaging particular states. The problem with this ac-
count of equal treatment may lie, in significant respects, with its judicial
268. Josh Patashnik, Arizona v. California and the Equitable Apportionment of Interstate
Waterways, 56 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 41–46 (2014).
269. E.g., id at 3.
270. Id. at 35–46.
271. Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 522–23 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
272. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
273. 23 U.S.C. § 119(d) (2012).
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enforcement.274 There are many differences between the states, some natu-
rally occurring and some that result from the policies a state has pursued.275
It would therefore be easy for Congress to identify, ex post, some difference
between the states to justify federal regulations that either specifically identi-
fied particular states or that resulted in differential effects on different states,
even if those regulations were motivated, ex ante, by an impermissible
purpose.276
To take stock: there may be a long-standing belief that the states are
equal to one another in some respects. But the principle of state equality has
little basis in constitutional text or drafting history, and these sources also do
not specify the contours of the state equality principle. Furthermore, the
idea that federal laws cannot constitutionally specifically identify particular
states or result in differential effects on different states potentially conflicts
with other principles that are embodied in the Constitution’s structure,
longstanding congressional practice, and judicial precedent.
III. Redefinition: State Equality as State Dignity
While Shelby County appears to have changed the doctrine, identifying
the exact  change Shelby County made requires a certain amount of specula-
tion. Shelby County did not define the equal sovereignty principle with any
specificity or acknowledge that any change had occurred. Recognizing this
ambiguity, this Part offers one reading of Shelby County—namely, that the
Court searchingly reviewed the VRA because it differentiated between the
states in a way that impinged on the covered states’ dignity.277 The idea that
the states’ constitutional dignity limits how Congress may regulate the states
motivates other federalism doctrines, such as the state sovereign immunity
and commandeering doctrines. In those contexts, the states’ dignity entitles
them to be viewed as well-behaving institutions that deserve to be treated
with respect. A close reading of Shelby County suggests that the Court con-
ceptualized the equal sovereignty principle in similar state dignity terms.
A. State Dignity
1. Unpacking State Dignity
Several doctrines rely on the concept of state dignity. These include both
the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, as well as doctrines prohibiting
274. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitu-
tional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1250–52 (1978).
275. See generally Young, supra note 194.
276. Ptasynski, for example, concluded that an exemption for Alaskan oil was not “in-
tended to grant Alaska an undue preference” because of differences between Alaska and other
states. United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 86 (1983).
277. Scholars have observed this in passing. See, e.g., Fishkin, supra note 19 (regarding
argument and briefing); Issacharoff, supra note 18, at 100–01; Reva B. Siegel, Foreword: Equal-
ity Divided, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 70–71 (2013).
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Congress from commandeering the states. Under the state sovereign immu-
nity doctrine, Congress may not subject unconsenting states to suits for
damages by private individuals.278 To explain states’ immunity from suit, the
Court has repeatedly invoked the concept of dignity: states “retain the dig-
nity . . . of sovereignty;”279 “[s]overeign immunity . . . ‘accords the States the
respect owed them as members of the federation;’ ”280 immunity avoids “the
indignity of subjecting a State”281 to the adjudicative process, which would
“denigrate[ ] the . . . States.”282 The concept of dignity does real work here—
it is, in the Court’s words, a “central,” “preeminent,” and “primary” justifi-
cation for state sovereign immunity.283
In the sovereign immunity context, states’ “dignity” refers to a set of
three related entitlements. The first is a kind of unaccountability. The sover-
eign immunity cases describe the indignity of a state being “summoned . . .
to answer” for wrongful behavior and being “required to answer” allega-
tions.284 The implication is that it is inconsistent with states’ dignity to hold
them accountable, even for past wrongful behavior:285 the states’ dignity “ex-
cuses [the state] from having to account for its actions.”286 The second ele-
ment of states’ dignity is hierarchical—by virtue of the states’ dignity, the
state does not have to answer to citizens for what the state has done. That is,
the state’s superior status means that it is an indignity for the state to have to
answer to individuals who lack a commensurable status to the state.287 The
third element of the states’ dignity is that the states’ status entitles them to
be viewed with a certain kind of respect: the states’ dignity requires citizens
and the federal government to assume states will behave themselves in ways
that reflect their status. The Court’s focus on state dignity prompted a cau-
tionary warning that the federal government cannot “assume the States will
refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United
States.”288 Almost a century earlier, Justice Harlan made the same point,
278. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756–60 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 75–76 (1996).
279. Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.
280. Id. at 748–49 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506
U.S. 139, 146 (1993)); id. at 715 (immunity is “central to sovereign dignity”); see also Fed.
Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 769 (2002) (same).
281. Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (quoting Ex parte Ayres, 123 U.S. 445, 505 (1887)).
282. Id.
283. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. at 760, 765, 769.
284. Id. at 760.
285. See Don Herzog, Aristocratic Dignity?, in Dignity, Rank & Rights 99, 105 (Meir
Dan-Cohen ed., 2012); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1011, 1038–47 (2000).
286. See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of
Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1921, 1946 (2003).
287. See Herzog, supra note 285, at 99–106; Meltzer, supra note 285, at 1038–47; Resnik &
Suk, supra note 286, at 1946–48.
288. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1998).
1254 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 114:1207
which he explicitly framed in terms of maintaining a “decent respect for the
States.”289
Elements of this kind of thinking about state dignity also appear in the
anticommandeering doctrine.290 The anticommandeering cases hold that
Congress may not require state legislatures to enact particular laws291 or re-
quire state executives to enforce or administer federal law.292 To justify these
doctrines, the Court has used language evoking  dignity.293 Indeed, the
Court has depicted commandeering as Congress “dragoon[ing]” the states,
and has expressed concern that commandeering “reduc[ed] [the states] to
puppets of a ventriloquist Congress.”294
At least two of these conceptions of state dignity also appeared in con-
temporary thinking about Reconstruction. First, there was real discomfort
with acknowledging Southern states’ responsibility for the institution of
slavery. Eric Foner’s historical account of Reconstruction describes how con-
cerns for the dignity of the South led post-Civil War Southern state conven-
tions to “sidestep[ ] the question of responsibility” for slavery and proclaim
that “[t]he institution of slavery [was] destroyed,” rather than noting which
states had destroyed it and which states had defended it.295 David Blight’s
account of Reconstruction similarly highlights the extent to which notions
of state dignity led contemporaries to proclaim that “slavery was everyone’s
and no one’s responsibility.”296 These narratives share a common thread—
289. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 176 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
290. See generally Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1503, 1556–64 (2000) (concluding that expressive
considerations play a major role in anticommandeering cases); Evan H. Caminker, Judicial
Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 81 (2001) (exploring the
implications of the Court’s unease about state dignity in anticommandeering cases); Adam B.
Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Anti-Commandeering Rule?, 33 Loy. L.A.
L. Rev. 1309 (2000) (concluding that anti-commandeering might serve to promote state
autonomy).
291. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–66 (1992).
292. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907–33 (1997).
293. Adam Cox has described how the reasoning in these cases demonstrates a concern
that “commandeering might send a message . . . denigratory of state[s].” Cox, supra note 290,
at 1339–40. “The very word ‘commandeering’ conjures up . . . an extreme exercise of subordi-
nation . . . .” Anderson & Pildes, supra note 290, at 1559. For the argument that the anticom-
mandeering rules cannot be justified on this basis, see Caminker, supra note 290, at 90–91,
and Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz,
and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71, 137–42.
294. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (quoting Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839 (1975)).
295. Eric Foner, Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution 1863–1877, at
194 (1988) (quoting Journal of the Proceedings and Debates in the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Mississippi, August 1865, at 165 (1865)).
296. David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory 205
(2001); id. (quoting a Confederate veteran saying, “It is not now profitable to discuss the right
or wrong of the past . . . neither should the question be raised as to the morals of Massachu-
setts selling her slaves and South Carolina holding hers . . . .”); id. at 61 (quoting Horace
Greeley as saying “I entreat you to forget the years of slavery, and secession, and civil war now
happily past . . . .”).
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notions of fault and responsibility are inconsistent with state dignity. Sec-
ond, there was also a series of claims that relied on the idea that the South-
ern states should be viewed in ways commensurate with their status as states.
In an 1863 piece, Reconstruction of The Union, the writer implored the North
“to consider and respect the South as an equal.”297 Resisting the idea of fed-
eral supervision during Reconstruction, Southern representatives spoke of
the “ ‘respect’ due the South” and “the ‘equal honor and equal liberties of
each section.’ ”298
The idea that states have this particular kind of dignity has a doctrinal
foothold in both sovereign immunity and anticommandeering doctrine. But
state dignity is not a universal rule across other doctrines. State courts are
constitutionally obligated to hear federal claims,299 and the commandeering
cases maintain that the federal government can impress state judicial officers
into federal service.300 Congress may also impose direct, affirmative obliga-
tions on the states in the course of regulating the states under the Commerce
Clause.301 Congress may also conditionally preempt state laws by threatening
to impose federal regulations unless the state regulates according to federal
directives.302 Each of these mechanisms arguably implicates states’ dignity
but is nonetheless permissible. State dignity therefore only selectively ap-
pears in the doctrine, but it is at least a motivating force in sovereign immu-
nity and anticommandeering doctrines.
2. State Dignity in Equal Sovereignty
Shelby County draws on these conceptions of state dignity in several
ways. First, the opinion’s language and reasoning reflect a general uneasiness
with holding states accountable for violations of federal law, as well as a
more specific concern with singling states out for violating constitutional
guarantees that have a moral valence to them. The Court also generally
framed the equal sovereignty principle in terms of dignity, and the Court’s
uneasiness with how the VRA treated the covered states—by requiring them
to seek permission before enacting laws—reflects state-dignity concerns as
well.
Shelby County relies on the idea that states’ dignity entitles them to a
kind of unaccountability—it requires us to ignore the states’ past wrongful
behavior. Shelby County suggested the VRA was inconsistent with the Re-
construction Amendments, because the Amendments were not designed to
“punish [the states] for the past.”303 This is trafficking in the intuition from
297. Citizen of Iowa, Reconstruction of the Union: Suggestions to the People of
the North on a Reconstruction of the Union 11 (1863).
298. Fishkin, supra note 19, at 182 (quoting Blight, supra note 296, at 81–84).
299. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
300. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907, 928–29 (1997).
301. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554–57 (1985).
302. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171–74 (1992).
303. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2629 (2013) (emphasis added).
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state sovereign immunity doctrine that it is inconsistent with the states’ dig-
nity to hold the states accountable for their past wrongful behavior. Shelby
County repeatedly faulted Congress for relying on a history of particular
states behaving badly.304 As Shelby County noted, the VRA reflected the fact
that the covered states refused to ratify the Reconstruction Amendments;
openly defied the Reconstruction Amendments through Black Codes and
other laws; and repeatedly, over several decades, attempted to resist federal
civil rights laws.305 The Court cited a history of states’ defiance of federal
law: “States ‘merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the
federal decrees,’ ‘enacted difficult new tests,’ or simply ‘defied and evaded
court orders.’ ”306 The coverage formula itself referred to a time—between
1964 and 1972—when the covered states openly defied federal law.307
But the VRA did not merely seek to hold the states accountable for
violations of federal law. Rather, the VRA identified states as having acted in
ways that offend basic notions of right and wrong. As the Court noted, Con-
gress relied on the covered states’ history of racial discrimination.308 The
covered “States had enacted a variety of requirements and tests ‘specifically
designed to prevent’ African-Americans from voting.”309 These are ugly
facts, and they add another dimension to the Court’s uneasiness about hold-
ing states accountable for violations of federal law, The VRA did not merely
call out some states for failing to pay their employees the minimum wage;
rather, it singled out states that acted in especially morally blameworthy
ways. Shelby County observed that the VRA “distinguish[ed] between [the]
States in . . . a fundamental way”—by suggesting that some states were more
likely to violate federal constitutional guarantees with a moral resonance.310
And Shelby County reflects a concern with singling out states on that basis.311
Other language in Shelby County similarly conveys that the Court con-
ceptualized the constitutional injury to the states in terms of dignity. Shelby
County’s use of the phrase “disparate treatment”312 to describe the VRA
evokes dignity-oriented concerns: the phrase “disparate treatment” typically
describes impermissible forms of discrimination.313 Shelby County also dis-
approvingly referred to the coverage formula as “ ‘reverse-engineered’: Con-
gress identified the jurisdictions to be covered and then came up with
304. Id. at 2627, 2629.
305. See id. at 2628 (“That comparison reflected the different histories of the North and
South.”).
306. Id. at 2624 (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966)).
307. Id. at 2627–28.
308. Id. at 2624, 2628.
309. Id. at 2624 (quoting Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310).
310. Id. at 2630–31.
311. See id. at 2624.
312. E.g., id. at 2630.
313. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418–19 (2013); United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013).
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criteria to describe them.”314 The Court then equated reverse-engineering
with Congress “subjecting a disfavored subset of States” to federal regula-
tion.315 The idea that the VRA targeted “disfavored States” calls to mind the
Court’s reasoning that laws may work an indignity on particular groups
when the laws subject “disfavored class[es]” to “disfavored legal status.”316
Second, Shelby County generally framed the equal sovereignty principle
in terms of dignity. Shelby County quoted Coyle’s statement that the United
States is “a union of States, equal in . . . dignity.”317 During oral argument,
the advocates318 and justices319 repeatedly referred to equal sovereignty in
terms of dignity, as did the petitioners in their briefs.320 In the NAMUDNO
argument, Justice Kennedy stated that, in his view, the VRA implicitly con-
tained “a finding that the sovereignty of Georgia is less than the sovereign
dignity of Ohio.”321
Third, Shelby County’s language suggests that the particular way in
which the covered states were treated—the preclearance process—implicated
the dignity-driven idea that states should be treated as having a certain sta-
tus. Laws may implicate equality concerns based in part on how the laws
treat those singled out for differential treatment.322 Shelby County described
314. 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
315. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2628 (emphasis added).
316. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (quoting U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449
U.S. 166, 181 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring)); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575
(2003); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 63 (1996).
317. 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)).
318. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21–23, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96)
[hereinafter Shelby County Transcript]; see also Fishkin, supra note 19 (noting that Shelby
County advocates argued that Act offends “equal dignity” of covered states).
319. See, e.g., Shelby County Transcript, supra note 318, at 58 (“Justice Scalia: Do you
think all of the noncovered States are worse . . . than the nine covered States . . . ?”); Fishkin,
supra note 19, at 175 (noting the Chief Justice’s question: “[I]s it the government’s submission
that the citizens in the South are more racist than citizens in the North?” (quoting Shelby
County Transcript, supra note 318, at 41–42)).
320. Brief for Petitioner at 49–50, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96); Reply Brief
for Petitioner at 9, Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96); see Fishkin, supra note 19.
321. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder,
557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322) (emphasis added).
322. See, e.g., Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 Va. L. Rev. 817, 818 (2014). In assessing the constitutionality of laws that target or
burden particular individuals, the Court considers what kind of burden the law imposes.
United States v. Windsor, for example, stated that the Defense of Marriage Act implicated
equality principles in part because the law operated as “a system-wide enactment” that im-
posed significant burdens and costs on same-sex couples. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013). And
Romer v. Evans explained that a law was invalid in part because it imposed a “broad and
undifferentiated disability” on those subjected to differential treatment. 517 U.S. 620, 632
(1996). The constitutional norms of equality between persons are not necessarily the same as
the norms of equality between states. But in either case, how a law treats those subjected to
differential treatment may affect the assessment of whether the law amounts to unequal treat-
ment at all.
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the VRA as “subjecting” some states to federal regulation.323 And the Court
disapprovingly noted how the Act “requires States to beseech the Federal
Government for permission to implement laws.”324 The Court’s depiction of
how the VRA positioned the covered states as subjects beseeching a superior
is reminiscent of the language from the anticommandeering cases, which
evinced a concern that commandeering did not treat the states in ways com-
mensurate with their importance.325 Shelby County also contains multiple
references to the burden the preclearance process imposed on the states that
were selected for differential treatment: preclearance was, in the Court’s
words, an “extraordinary measure[ ]” that “required States to obtain federal
permission before enacting any law related to voting”;326 it “suspend[ed] all
changes to state election law—however innocuous”;327 and it was a “strin-
gent,” “potent,” and “uncommon exercise of congressional power.”328
The language and reasoning in Shelby County therefore suggests the
Court conceived of the equal sovereignty principle in terms of dignity.
B. Alternative Accounts
There are, however, other ways to read Shelby County—the decision
could be an application of the congruence and proportionality standard,
which is a form of heightened scrutiny the Court applies to certain kinds of
legislation enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelby County could
instead embody a general skepticism of laws that are based on outdated data.
While both of these ideas also appeared in Shelby County, they are not,
standing alone, the basis for the Court’s opinion. Rather, both of these ways
of reading Shelby County are linked with the Court’s apparent concern for
state dignity.
1. Congruence and Proportionality
Shelby County might be read to suggest that courts will searchingly re-
view laws that distinguish among the states if those laws were enacted pursu-
ant to the Reconstruction Amendments.329 One might think that City of
Boerne v. Flores supports this account of the equal sovereignty principle,
323. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2628 (emphasis added).
324. Id. at 2616 (emphasis added).
325. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 290, at 1331–40 (describing how the reasoning in these
cases demonstrates a concern that “commandeering might send a message . . . denigratory of
state autonomy”).
326. 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (emphasis added).
327. Id. at 2624 (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193,
202 (2009)).
328. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 315, 334, 337 (1966)).
329. Here, I treat the Reconstruction Amendments collectively. There may be reasons why
Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality requirement would not apply to the Fifteenth
Amendment. See Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Pow-
ers, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1127, 1190–91 (2001). Besides the tension with congruence and propor-
tionality, there are other reasons why a rule explicitly imposing a heightened standard of
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because Boerne imposed limits on Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment
powers that do not apply to Congress’s powers under Article I. Under
Boerne, when Congress exercises its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement
power, Congress may only impose regulations that are “congruen[t] and
proportional[ ],” rather than merely rationally related to the objective of the
law.330 Boerne therefore requires a closer fit between a law and the problem it
is designed to address than would be required under Article I.331
However, Shelby County described equal sovereignty as a freestanding
and fundamental principle not specifically tied to any particular congres-
sional power.332 The Court only mentioned the Fifteenth Amendment when
it quoted the Amendment in a section detailing the history of the VRA and
one other time in passing.333 And, prior to Shelby County, the Court had
never said that Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality standard applied to
legislation enacted under the Fifteenth Amendment.334 Nor did Shelby
County say that it did.
Moreover, Boerne’s congruence-and-proportionality requirement does
not require more rigorous scrutiny of Congress’s decision to impose differ-
ent rules on different states. Boerne established limits on Congress’s powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment in order to ensure that Congress enforces
the Amendment’s substantive guarantees.335 To ensure that Congress en-
forces, but does not change, the Amendment’s substance, the congruence-
and-proportionality test measures the disparity between what the Constitu-
tion prohibits states from doing and what Congress prohibits states from
doing.336 The difference between what Congress requires of the states and
what the Constitution requires of the states goes to the core of Boerne’s
claim that Congress does not have “the power to decree the substance of”
the Amendments or to “alter[ ] the[ir] meaning.”337
But Congress’s choice of which states to regulate does not change the
meaning of those substantive guarantees. For example, Congress may choose
to establish “private remedies against . . . States for actual violations” of the
Constitution; this kind of law clearly “enforces” the Reconstruction Amend-
ments, because it punishes the states only for unconstitutional conduct.338
review on legislation enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments would be unjustified. See
infra Section IV.B.
330. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
331. Id.
332. E.g., Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (“the principle”); id. at 2621 (“our historic
tradition”); id. at 2622 (“the fundamental principle”); id. at 2623–24 (same).
333. Id. at 2619, 2629.
334. See Jeremy Amar-Dolan, Note, The Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment
Standard of Review, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1477, 1479 (2014).
335. See 521 U.S. at 519.
336. See, e.g., id. at 532; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80–83, 91
(2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647
(1999).
337. 521 U.S. at 519.
338. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006).
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But the same would be true if Congress instead chose to create private reme-
dies against only some states for actual constitutional violations. Where
Congress enacts prophylactic legislation—legislation that prohibits the states
from doing something the Constitution permits—Boerne requires Congress
to establish a pattern of states violating judicial interpretations of the Con-
stitution.339 But Congress may choose to impose a regulation on only some
of the states that are violating the Constitution without creating any real risk
that Congress is changing the substance of the Amendment’s guarantees as
opposed to enforcing them.
The equal sovereignty principle is not an application of Boerne’s con-
gruence-and-proportionality for another reason. Boerne’s congruence-and-
proportionality requirement may sometimes require Congress to treat some
states differently than others. Imagine that in one state, there are 500 consti-
tutional violations per year; in every other state there is one constitutional
violation per year.340 If the corresponding legislation must apply the same
rule to all the states, there is something off balance when a law imposes the
same burden on a state with 500 violations as on a state with one. United
States v. Morrison relied on this idea in holding that the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) exceeded Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth
Amendment.341 VAWA purported to create a cause of action against individ-
uals in every state,342 and Morrison held this was not congruent or propor-
tional to the problem of state-sanctioned gender discrimination. Morrison
explained:
Congress’s findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against the
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all States, or even
most States. By contrast, the § 5 remedy upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
was directed only to the State where the evil found by Congress existed,
and in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the remedy was directed only to those
States in which Congress found that there had been discrimination.343
This reasoning highlights how Boerne’s concern that Fourteenth Amend-
ment legislation should have a closer “fit” between means and ends implies
that federal statutes sometimes can impose different rules on different states.
Even before Morrison, the Civil Rights Cases relied on similar reasoning to
invalidate the Civil Rights Act of 1875, noting that the Act “applie[d] equally
to cases arising in States which have the justest laws respecting the personal
339. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 531–36; see also Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 368 (2001); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645; Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999).
340. Cf. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 64 (2010) (“[T]here are 123 juvenile nonhomi-
cide offenders serving life without parole sentences. A significant majority of those, 77 in total,
are serving sentences imposed in Florida. The other 46 are imprisoned in just 10 States . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
341. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000).
342. Id. at 626 (“Section 13981 is also different from these previously upheld remedies in
that it applies uniformly throughout the Nation.”).
343. Id. at 626–27 (citations omitted).
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rights of citizens . . . as to those which arise in States that may have violated
the prohibition of the amendment.”344
In addition to undermining a law’s “fit,” a uniformity requirement
would also maximize the number of states subject to federal supervision.
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs illustrates this dynamic.345
Hibbs held that the Family and Medical Leave Act provisions requiring state
employers to provide twelve weeks of family-care leave were congruent and
proportional exercises of Congress’s power to enforce the Reconstruction
Amendments.346 To explain that conclusion, Hibbs focused on the “short-
comings of some state policies,” including the fact that “seven States had
childcare leave provisions that applied to women only.”347 If a pattern of
some, or seven, states engaging in constitutional violations justifies federal
legislation, a uniformity requirement would require Congress to impose fed-
eral supervision on all the states rather than just some of them. Before
Hibbs, Morrison had implied that Congress may be able to regulate all of the
states if Congress establishes that a majority of the states are engaged in
constitutional violations.348 But even if Congress may regulate all of the
states based only on a pattern of constitutional violations in twenty-six
states, a uniformity requirement will still result in more states being subject
to federal supervision. The same would be true if Congress could regulate
the states only if all fifty were engaged in constitutional violations: without a
uniformity requirement, Congress could choose to impose federal regulation
on some of the states rather than on all of them.
2. Stale Facts
Shelby County might alternatively mean that laws that are based on old
data are suspect, or that laws restricting state autonomy based on old data
are suspect. The opinion repeatedly expressed concern with the fact that the
coverage formula relied on “decades-old data” documenting the states’ ac-
tions thirty to forty years ago.349 Allison Orr Larsen has recently argued that
it was on this basis that Shelby County invalidated the coverage formula.
344. 109 U.S. 3, 14 (1883).
345. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
346. Id. at 737.
347. Id. at 733 (emphasis added). Hibbs noted several other possible shortcomings with
other states’ laws. Id. at 733–34.
348. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 636 (noting the “problem of discrimination . . . does not
exist in . . . even most States”). The legislative history showed “at least 21 States documenting
constitutional violations” and Congress “made its own findings about pervasive gender-based
stereotypes” in other states’ legal systems. Id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
349. See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2619, 2622, 2627 (2013) (suggesting
Act “must be justified by current needs” (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009))).
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According to Larsen, “the passage of time and changed circumstances cre-
ated a distinct reason to invalidate the law—rendering it obsolete and effec-
tively expired.”350 But while Shelby County repeatedly faulted Congress for
relying on “decades-old data,” the passage of time alone had not rendered
the VRA unconstitutional. Shelby County invalidated the 2006 reauthoriza-
tion of the VRA—not the versions that had been enacted in 1965 or 1974.351
Shelby County suggested that the 2006 reauthorization was the same as
the prior versions with respect to the old data: “Congress did not use the
record it compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current condi-
tions. It instead reenacted a formula based on 40-year-old facts . . . .”352 The
coverage formula, to be sure, specifically referred to “40-year-old” facts. But
it is not clear why the Court concluded Congress had entirely ignored the
15,000-page legislative record in choosing to stick with the same coverage
formula.353
It is also difficult to reconcile the idea that Congress can never consider
or rely on decades-old facts with the reality of congressional legislation. For
example, the legislative history of the CAA rehashes California’s regulation
of vehicle emissions over decades.354 Statutes preempting state law also docu-
ment the kinds of laws that states enacted in the past—sometimes several
decades ago.355 Prior cases have also suggested that Congress can enact a law
based on “historical” data: Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining
Co. upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act’s regional sugar quotas, reason-
ing that “Congress fixed the quotas on a historical basis.”356 And “[o]utside
of Shelby County . . . the Supreme Court has never struck down a law” on
the basis that it was “too old to remain constitutional.”357 It has, however,
done so on the ground that a law works some indignity on the states.358
350. Allison Orr Larsen, Do Laws Have a Constitutional Shelf Life?, 94 Tex. L. Rev. 59, 61
(2015).
351. 133 S. Ct. at 2620–21.
352. Id. at 2629.
353. See id. at 2639–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing Congress’s review of DOJ
submissions); J. Morgan Kousser, Do the Facts of Voting Rights Support Chief Justice Roberts’s
Opinion in Shelby County?, 2015 Transatlantica 1 (2016), http://transatlantica.revues.org/
7462 [perma.cc/R764-4DMR]; Bertrall L. Ross II, The State as Witness: Windsor, Shelby
County, and Judicial Distrust of the Legislative Record, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2027, 2061–62 (2014).
354. See sources cited supra note 186.
355. See H.R. Rep. No. 112-470, at 396 (2012) (discussing particular state laws that are
not preempted); H.R. Rep. No. 110-374, pt. 1, at 24 (2007); H.R. Rep. No. 108-770, at 22–23
(2004) (identifying particular state laws as preempted); H.R. Rep. No. 108-680 (2004) (identi-
fying particular state laws consistent with federal policy); H.R. Rep. No. 106-775, pt. 1, at 170
(2000) (discussing proposed legislation’s incongruence with current standards); S. Rep. No.
106-299, at 63 (2000) (identifying particular state laws consistent with federal policy); H.R.
Rep. No. 103-877, at 68 (1994) (identifying particular states that regulate activity); H.R. Rep.
103-677, at 86 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (identifying particular states that do not regulate activity).
356. 338 U.S. 604, 618 (1950).
357. Larsen, supra note 350, at 38.
358. See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
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The idea that Congress cannot consider old facts is also ill-suited to the
particular context of the VRA. If Congress, in reauthorizing the VRA, could
not consider historical facts, Congress would be limited in its ability to con-
sider how the VRA affected the number and frequency of constitutional vio-
lations in the covered states.359 But this would be in tension with Boerne’s
congruence-and-proportionality requirement, which requires Congress to
rigorously justify legislation enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment and
to establish a particularly close connection between a law’s means and
ends.360
Shelby County did repeatedly mention the fact that the coverage formula
was based on decades-old data. But the constitutional defect in Shelby
County was not only that Congress relied on decades-old data, or even that
it relied on such data to limit state autonomy. Rather, the constitutional
violation in Shelby County was about the kind of decades-old data on which
Congress had relied—data that evinced the states’ ugly histories of racial
discrimination—and the purpose it was used for—predicting that states
were likely to discriminate on the basis of race in voting regulations. Larsen
suggested that courts may be justified in finding a statute unconstitutional
on the ground that the statute relied on stale facts so long as the statute
independently called for “a form of heightened scrutiny.”361 And Shelby
County implied that the VRA warranted a form of heightened scrutiny, be-
cause the Act distinguished between the states in ways that impinged on the
covered states’ dignity.362
Unlike the early admission cases’ version of equal sovereignty, Shelby
County’s conception of equal sovereignty is more clearly related to equality
in that it is particularly likely to be implicated by laws that differentiate be-
tween the states. Laws of this nature suggest that some responsibility or
blame lies with the particular states subject to federal regulation, thus impli-
cating notions of unaccountability and states’ dignity. Laws regulating most
or all of the states, by contrast, hold everyone—and thus no one—
accountable.
359. See Katz, supra note 127.
360. See Ellen D. Katz, Dismissing Deterrence, 127 Harv. L. Rev. F. 248 (2014). Cases
applying the congruence and proportionality standard may have incentivized Congress to hew
to a version of the VRA that had previously been upheld. Nathaniel Persily, The Constitutional
Relevance of Alleged Legislative Dysfunction, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 256 (2008), http://
yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-constitutional-relevance-of-alleged-legislative-dysfunction
[http://perma.cc/V8TM-KQMG] (naming this and other judicially driven incentives for Con-
gress not to compile additional evidence in legislative record).
361. Larsen, supra note 350, at 101.
362. Larsen argued that “federalism notions . . . cannot explain the statute’s invalidation”
because they were “not enough to invalidate the law in 1965 or 1972 or 1982.” Id. at 60 n.5.
But the federalism concerns I have identified could warrant some kind of heightened review
that made the VRA’s reliance on outdated data problematic. See id. (“The nature of the consti-
tutional violation in Shelby County is also wrapped up in notions of federalism . . . .”).
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IV. Reflection: Doctrinal Justifications
Identifying state dignity as a motivating principle in Shelby County’s ap-
plication of the equal sovereignty principle does two things. First, it helps to
categorize equal sovereignty as an expressive norm, meaning one that is con-
cerned with the symbolic significance of laws. Expressive norms of constitu-
tional law are grounded in the idea that “[p]ublic policies can violate the
Constitution . . . because the meaning they convey expresses inappropriate
respect for relevant constitutional norms.”363 Scholars have argued that sev-
eral federalism doctrines—most notably anticommandeering and state sov-
ereign immunity doctrines—are best understood as expressive norms.364
These scholars maintain that anticommandeering and state sovereign immu-
nity doctrines’ focus on state dignity reveals a concern with what federal
laws communicate or express about the states’ role in the federal system.365
Because Shelby County is driven by the same conception of state dignity that
appears in these doctrines, it is reasonable to think that equal sovereignty
too may be an expressive norm. The rhetoric in Shelby County also evinces a
concern with what the VRA said, or communicated, about the covered
states.366
Second, conceptualizing the equal sovereignty principle in terms of state
dignity narrows the scope of the principle, such that it will apply almost
exclusively to legislation enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments. By
virtue of Boerne and its progeny, legislation enacted under the Reconstruc-
tion Amendments must focus on occasions where states have violated the
Constitution. These kinds of laws therefore may be particularly likely to im-
plicate state-dignity concerns that arise from holding states accountable for
wrongful behavior.
Framing the equal sovereignty principle in terms of dignity, and corre-
spondingly narrowing the principle, has a significant upside—insulating the
many existing federal laws that differentiate between the states from equal
sovereignty challenges. But conceptualizing the equal sovereignty principle
in terms of dignity does little by way of providing a justification for the
principle. Specifically, it is hard to spell out a persuasive justification for an
equal sovereignty principle that is grounded in dignity. This Part explores
two different kinds of justifications for the equal sovereignty principle: (1)
instrumental justifications, which maintain that laws are unconstitutional
363. Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms,
and Constitutionalism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725, 755 (1998).
364. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 290, at 1551–63; Seinfeld, supra note 75, at
1088.
365. See, e.g., Anderson & Pildes, supra note 290, at 1551–63; Cox, supra note 290, at
1331–40; Resnik & Suk, supra note 286; Suzanna Sherry, States are People Too, 75 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1121, 1125–31 (2000).
366. See infra text accompanying notes 369–389.
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because the message they convey results in adverse effects or conse-
quences;367 and (2) intrinsic justifications, which maintain that laws are un-
constitutional because they convey a particular message.368
A. Instrumental Justifications
One set of justifications for expressive norms maintains that laws may
not communicate a message if communicating that message results in ad-
verse effects or consequences.369 Under this view, laws may not express a
message for instrumental reasons—that is to avoid causing downstream
harms that result from communicating that message.
Coyle and Shelby County suggested one instrumental justification for
equal sovereignty—“the harmonious operation of the scheme upon which
the Republic was organized.”370 The idea here seems to be that equal sover-
eignty enables the union of fifty states to function as one cohesive unit. This
principle motivates various doctrines ranging from the dormant Commerce
Clause,371 to interstate recognition of judgments,372 to intergovernmental tax
immunity.373
However, these other doctrines are default rules that Congress is free to
alter. That is, while states generally may not discriminate against out-of-state
commerce, Congress can allow them to do so.374 The same is true for inter-
state recognition of judgments: states have limited freedom to decline to
recognize out-of-state judgments, but Congress may expand the circum-
stances under which they may do so.375 So too with inter-governmental tax
immunity: states are generally not free to tax the federal government, but
Congress may waive the federal government’s immunity from state taxa-
tion.376 There are various reasons why Congress is entrusted with these pow-
ers: each state is represented in Congress, Congress is structured to legislate
for the entire Union, and Congress’s powers are plenary.377 The key point is
that other doctrines designed to safeguard the cohesiveness of the Union are
367. See Primus, supra note 38, at 569–70 (characterizing a theory of expressive harm that
is “concerned with the damage done by the content of messages that laws send” as
consequentialist).
368. See id. at 577.
369. Id. at 569.
370. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221
U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
371. Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091, 1113 (1986).
372. Metzger, supra note 37, at 1493–94.
373. Seinfeld, supra note 75, at 1105–09.
374. See S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91–92 (1984); Metzger,
supra note 37, at 1483.
375. See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1532 (discussing how Section 2 of DOMA authorizes
states to deviate from the interstate recognition of judgments doctrine).
376. See Seinfeld, supra note 75, at 1105–09.
377. See Metzger, supra note 37, at 1482–83.
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default rules that Congress may alter. It would thus be strange if, in the
name of ensuring that the fifty states operate as a cohesive union, equal
sovereignty functioned as a strong constraint on congressional power. It is
true, in both the dormant Commerce Clause and Full Faith and Credit
Clause examples, that Congress authorizes the states, rather than Congress,
to discriminate against other states. But this distinction seems to be of little
difference. States may only discriminate against other states with Congress’s
blessing, and Congress also occasionally authorizes only some states to dis-
criminate against other states, as opposed to authorizing all of the states to
do so.378
Moreover, it is not clear that equal sovereignty identifies particularly
problematic forms of tension between the states and the federal government
or among the states. Federalism envisions that the states will at times express
disagreement with federal policies—including by organizing opposition to a
policy or by enacting different policies.379 But, at other times, the states are
forced to grin and bear it—they are not allowed to nullify or repeal federal
statutes with which they disagree.380 And it is not clear that equal sovereignty
identifies occasions where states’ disagreement with or distaste for federal
policy is especially harmful to the Union.
A second possible instrumental justification for equal sovereignty is that
the principle “preserv[es] and reinforce[es] [the] public[’s] perception of the
states as credible alternative political institutions.”381 Treating states differ-
ently does not necessarily compromise or undermine the values that federal-
ism serves, such as increasing local decisionmaking or ensuring regulatory
diversity. But there is a sense in which some benefits of federalism, including
greater opportunities for meaningful political participation and limiting the
power of the federal government, depend on the existence of states as “alter-
native political institutions.”382 In other words, for federalism to work, the
states must be able to do meaningful things—to pursue novel regulatory
programs, organize resistance to federal overreaching, et cetera.383 The equal
sovereignty principle may be designed to ensure that the public continues to
believe that the states are capable of doing these things.384
378. See supra notes 370–374 and accompanying text.
379. See generally Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism,
118 Yale L.J. 1256 (2009); Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1485
(1994).
380. See Seinfeld, supra note 75.
381. Cox, supra note 290, at 1312.
382. Id. at 1323.
383. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 379; Kramer, supra note 379.
384. It is not clear how the equal sovereignty principle could ensure that the states are
actually capable of doing these things. The equal sovereignty principle does not meaningfully
enhance local decisionmaking or state autonomy, see supra Section II.C.1, or the states’ capac-
ity to enact effective policies that diminish the need for federal regulation.
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However, this account of equal sovereignty probably rests on too many
questionable assumptions to serve as a justification.385 For example, did peo-
ple (either federal legislators or citizens) perceive the VRA as denigrating the
states? Did they internalize those perceptions and choose not to participate
in their states’ political processes? Did striking down the VRA’s coverage
formula wash away those perceptions? Is the Court’s message that states are
important political institutions worthy of respect sufficiently clear?
The answer to some of these questions is probably “no.” A survey of the
congressional record disclosed thirty-three mentions of Shelby County, but
almost all of them are critical and call for Congress to make a new VRA.386
In none of these occasions did members of Congress even mention equal
sovereignty or signal an understanding that it must treat the states as well-
behaving institutions. As of this writing, a news search for Shelby County
and “equal sovereignty” or “sovereign dignity” revealed only fifty sources,
almost all of them law professors’ blogs.387 Many of the blogs, like the con-
gressional record, are critical of the decision.388 It is also unlikely that the
opinion in Shelby County had a significant effect on how people viewed their
states. It is not clear how many non-lawyers read the opinion or took away
from the opinion the idea that the states are important, well-behaving politi-
cal institutions.389 The preclearance process may have had some effect on
citizens’ perceptions of the covered states, or at least the states’ authority to
regulate voting qualifications. But in this telling, the imposition of
preclearance was the primary constitutional defect in the VRA, and Shelby
County pointedly avoided issuing a holding on the validity of
preclearance.390
385. For other problems with the foregoing account of the equal sovereignty principle,
compare the discussion of problems related to state sovereign immunity in Caminker, supra
note 290, at 90–91.
386. The search was for: “Shelby County” /p “Holder.” E.g., 159 Cong. Rec. 228 (2013);
159 Cong. Rec. 1000 (2013); cf. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 293, at 138 (conducting a similar
search regarding Printz and New York). One senator proclaimed: “[T]he Shelby County deci-
sion was a dreadful decision and wrongly decided.” 160 Cong. Rec. 6177 (2014).
387. The search terms were: “Shelby County” & (“equal sovereignty” or “sovereign
dignity”).
388. E.g., Paul Abrams, The 15th Amendment Trumps the 10th Amendment On Voting
Rights, Huffington Post: Blog (July 1, 2013, 8:27 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
paul-abrams/the-15th-amendment-trumps_b_3527256.html [http://perma.cc/ND7Z-L7WC].
389. Cf. Richard Primus, Why Enumeration Matters, 115 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2016) (manuscript at 31-34), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2471924
[https://perma.cc/QB3U-N9ZG] (suggesting that, for some legal principles articulated in Su-
preme Court opinions, “the primary audience . . . is not the broader public”).
390. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
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B. Intrinsic Justifications
Another kind of justification for expressive norms maintains that laws
may not communicate messages that are themselves constitutionally prob-
lematic.391 That is, laws may not express a particular message if the message
itself violates some constitutional principle. Under this view, the fact that a
law expresses or conveys a particular message—based on some objectively
reasonable public meaning of the statute—is what renders the law invalid.392
On some level, it is harder to engage with intrinsic justifications than
instrumental ones. An expressive norm is intrinsically justified when it is
unconstitutional for legislators to evince a particular viewpoint or attitude.
But how do we know whether a particular viewpoint is constitutionally ac-
ceptable for legislators to hold, especially with respect to federalism? It
might be hard to separate whether a statute “(objectively) say[s] the right
thing about federalism” from whether the statute “is otherwise justified on
federalism grounds.”393 In the context of the equal sovereignty principle, for
example, the principle would be intrinsically justified if there were some-
thing unconstitutional about the federal government evincing the view that
some states are especially morally blameworthy.
This understanding of the principle, however, seems unjustified given
how it will uniquely limit Congress’s ability to differentiate between the
states under the Reconstruction Amendments. Under Boerne and its prog-
eny, legislation enacted under the Reconstruction Amendments must focus
on occasions where states have violated the Constitution. Laws enforcing the
Reconstruction Amendments may therefore be especially likely to implicate
state-dignity concerns that arise from holding states accountable for wrong-
ful behavior. However, as this Part explains, the constitutional text, early
history, and structure do not suggest that laws that are enacted under the
Reconstruction Amendments and that differentiate between the states are
constitutionally suspect.
1. Text
The text of the Reconstruction Amendments arguably suggests that
Congress has more latitude to single out particular states when legislating
under those Amendments than when it legislates under Article I. The Re-
construction Amendments give Congress the power to “enforc[e]” the
Amendment’s guarantees.394 “Enforcing” a law entails a substantial and well-
recognized amount of discretion in selecting from among all wrongdoers.395
391. See Primus, supra note 38, at 566–70.
392. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 290, at 1513.
393. Adler & Kreimer, supra note 293, at 143.
394. U.S. Const. amends. XIII, XIV, XV.
395. See, e.g., Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Statutory Nonenforcement Power, 91 Tex.
L. Rev. See Also 115, 120–21 (2013), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/
Prakash.pdf [http://perma.cc/J4F6-7YD9] (discussing the executive’s authority to set enforce-
ment priorities); see also Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85
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And, under the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress has the power to
“enforce” the Amendments, including the discretion to choose which
wrongdoers will be subject to enforcement actions. It is also more coherent
to think that Congress “enforces” a law or “remedies” a violation by target-
ing particular wrongdoer(s) than by regulating all of the states collectively.396
2. Early History
Some early history undermines the idea that the Reconstruction
Amendments uniquely limit Congress’s ability to treat some states differ-
ently than others.397 The Reconstruction Amendments prohibited prac-
tices—namely, slavery and the Black Codes—that were occurring primarily
in only some states; the Amendments themselves were designed to constrain
the Southern states specifically.398 The Reconstruction Acts imposed condi-
tions on Southern states, conditioning their congressional representation on
their ratifying state constitutions that aligned with federal directives and re-
ceived congressional approval.399 The first and second Reconstruction Acts
divided up “the rebel States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and Arkansas” into
five military districts.400 The Acts authorized federal military officials to con-
duct voter registration and to organize state constitutional conventions in
those states.401 Federal law suspended the writ of habeas corpus in Southern
states.402 The Freedmen’s Bureau Act gave the War Department the power to
“control . . . all subjects relating to refugees and freedmen from rebel
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 795 (2010) (critiquing the high degree of executive discretion in nonenforce-
ment via agency inaction).
396. City of Boerne v. Flores maintained “enforce” means to “remedy or prevent.” 521 U.S.
507, 519 (1997).
397. Cf. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1183 (1867) (statement of Rep. Raymond)
(“We lay down the basis of reconstruction for restoring this Union.”); 2 Bruce Ackerman,
We the People: Transformations 199 (1998) (“From this vantage point, the First Recon-
struction Act is functionally equivalent to Article Seven of the 1787 Constitution.”); Akhil
Reed Amar et al., Reconstructing the Republic: The Great Transition of the 1860s, in Transi-
tions: Legal Change, Legal Meanings 98, 112 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012) (“[T]he First Re-
construction Act plainly directed ex-gray states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment with all
deliberate speed.”).
398. E.g., Foner, supra note 295, at 446 (“[The] concern [of the Fifteenth Amendment’s
drafters] was to enfranchise blacks in the border states and prevent a retreat . . . in the
South.”); Harrison, supra note 72, at 401–02 (arguing that one objective of the Fourteenth
Amendment was repealing Southern Black Codes). This differs from the narrative surrounding
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, which focused on the states’ collective fail-
ures. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional
Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1877, 1886–94 (2011).
399. Second Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 6, § 5, 15 Stat. 2, 3–4 (amending First Recon-
struction Act of 1867, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429).
400. Third Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 30, § 1, 15 Stat. 14, 14.
401. First Reconstruction Act of 1867, ch. 153, §5–6, 14 Stat. 428, 429; Second Recon-
struction Act of 1867 § 1–2.
402. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755; Harrison, supra note 72, at 405.
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states.”403 Subsequent acts gave federal commissioners the “power to seize,
hold, use, lease, or sell . . . any lands . . . formerly held under color of title by
the late so-called confederate states.”404 The Emancipation Proclamation
freed “all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a
State, [where] the people” were “in rebellion against the United States.”405
Some early congressional debates also support the idea that the Recon-
struction Amendments allow Congress to treat some states differently than
others.406 Some representatives at the time expressed concerns about
whether Congress would have any power, after the states’ admission, to do
anything to disobedient states.407 Other representatives responded that Con-
gress could treat states differently from one another if some of the states
violated a federal constitutional guarantee.408 With respect to the principle of
equal sovereignty, some representatives maintained that if “the Congress of
the United States have [sic] the right, speaking for all the States, to make a
general regulation . . . then they may make it in the case of any State . . . .”409
There was one exchange where a representative asserted it was “desirable
that this important question of State equality should now be once more
looked at and determined.”410 Another representative asked him “to point
me to the clause of the Constitution which requires it,” and the debate
ended.411
403. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 507 (emphasis added); see also Act of July
16, 1866, ch. 200, 14 Stat. 173, 173–74 (renewing the Freedmen’s Bureau Act on these terms).
404. Act of July 16, 1866 § 12.
405. Abraham Lincoln, Final Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 689 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
406. To be sure, there were some contrary statements as well. See Cong. Globe, 40th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 2603 (1868) (statement of Mr. Morton) (“[B]ut when these States are admit-
ted, when they have complied with all our conditions and come back and are received, then
they stand upon the same platform with every other State in the Union.”).
407. Id. at 2602 (statement of Sen. Trumbull) (“[A]s I said, this thing of imposing condi-
tions upon States is attended with a great deal of difficulty . . . .”); see also id. (“I am not
prepared to say what steps should be taken in case the State of Nebraska should hereafter
change its constitution, and in that change adopt a different rule in regard to suffrage from
that which was recognized at the time the State was admitted.”).
408. Id. at 2603 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“If one of these compacts should be vio-
lated . . . Congress then would have power to interfere with or without such a fundamental
condition . . . .”); see also id. at 2605 (statement of Sen. Stewart) (“[W]henever [States] abuse
any of the functions which are legitimately State functions so as to be in conflict with . . . the
Constitution, it is the duty of the Congress of the United States to interfere.”).
409. Id. at 2605 (statement of Sen. Conkling); see also id. (statement of Sen. Stewart)
(discussing both Pollard and Dred Scott with respect to the equal sovereignty principle).
410. Id. at 2606 (statement of Sen. Buckalew).
411. Id. at 2607 (statement of Sen. Drake). The minority report to the Acts argued that
“States possess[ ] equal rights and powers. States unequal are not known to the Constitution.”
See Edward McPherson, The Political History of the United States of America Dur-
ing the Period of Reconstruction, April 15, 1865 – July 15, 1870, at 94 (Da Capo Press,
Inc. 1972) (1871). However, the majority report made no mention of the state equality princi-
ple. Id. at 84–93.
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3. Constitutional Structure: Federalism and Nationalism
The Reconstruction Amendments authorize Congress to regulate the
states directly and to do so in noneconomic spheres that Congress may not
be able to regulate under its power to regulate interstate commerce.412 In
these areas, there are often very real differences between the states that might
call for different treatment. Consider the laws enacted during Reconstruc-
tion, which required some states to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and
established terms on which Southern states could enact and ratify state con-
stitutions.413 Today, Eighth Amendment cases414 and Fourteenth Amend-
ment substantive due process cases415 frequently highlight the extent to
which some states treat classes of their citizens very differently than other
states do. Other cases do as well. Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, for example, catalogued at least four different ways in which states
differed from one another in providing family-leave policies,416 and the legis-
lative history in Morrison documented myriad differences in how the states
prosecuted gender-based crimes.417
The standard account of federalism also assumes that states will differ
from one another in noneconomic spheres. The idea that citizens migrate to
states and communities that “share their values” assumes that the states will
differ from one another and experiment with “social, economic, and regula-
tory polic[ies].”418 And there are reasons to think the states differ more in
noneconomic spheres than economic ones. The Court’s enumerated-powers
jurisprudence more freely permits Congress to regulate in economic spheres
than noneconomic ones, because Congress has greater latitude to regulate
under Article I than under the Fourteenth Amendment.419 Congress’s wider
authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause may mean that the states
are more able to differ from one another in noneconomic spheres than in
economic spheres: where Congress has greater authority to regulate (in eco-
nomic spheres), it may enact more federal law and, in doing so, limit the
states’ regulatory options and ability to differ from one another.420
412. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626–27 (2000).
413. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73.
414. E.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407
(2008); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). The Eighth Amendment, of course, applies to
the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.
415. E.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2005).
416. 538 U.S. 721, 733–34 (2003).
417. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 636; see also id. at 666 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
418. Douglas Laycock, Voting with Your Feet Is No Substitute for Constitutional Rights, 32
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 29, 29, 33–34 (2009) (summarizing this view); see also Baker &
Young, supra note 194, at 157–58.
419. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Individual Right to Federalism in the Rehnquist Court,
74 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 888, 889–90 (2006).
420. See id. at 888–89 (arguing enumerated powers doctrine will lead to more
noneconomic differences between states); Young, supra note 194 (noting large differences in
social norms between states).
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The idea that the Reconstruction Amendments uniquely limit Con-
gress’s ability to distinguish among the states also runs counter to the idea
that the Reconstruction Amendments authorize greater intrusions into state
sovereignty than Article I does. Current doctrine, for example, maintains
that Congress can subject states to suits for damages under the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not under the interstate commerce power.421 The reason is
that the Reconstruction Amendments sanctioned a great “shift in the fed-
eral-state balance” and authorized “intrusions by Congress . . . into the judi-
cial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the
States.”422 Subsequent developments, particularly the second Reconstruction
during the 1960s, solidified the scope of Congress’s powers to expand and
enforce civil rights.423 Thus, it would be strange if Article I permitted Con-
gress to regulate the states in ways that the Reconstruction Amendments do
not.424
Shelby County also suggested that the VRA infringed on the covered
states’ dignity because it singled them out based on their histories of racial
discrimination.425 The opinion thus implies that Congress may be especially
limited in its ability to differentiate between the states when enacting legisla-
tion that seeks to remedy racial discrimination and enforce the equal protec-
tion guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment or the prohibition against
racial discrimination in voting of the Fifteenth Amendment. But the Recon-
struction Amendments uniquely empowered Congress to remedy racial dis-
crimination. Indeed, the Amendments were in part a response to the states’
racial discrimination.426 And subsequent legislative, judicial, and political de-
velopments have solidified the idea that how states treat their citizens, and
specifically whether states are discriminating on the basis of race, is a matter
of national concern and a proper basis for federal legislation.427 It would
therefore be strange if Congress were uniquely limited in its ability to rem-
edy racial discrimination under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
421. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). Some Article I powers partially
waive the states’ immunity from suit. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 359
(2006).
422. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455; see also Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpat-
rick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1259, 1270–71 (2001).
423. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 Yale L.J. 441, 516–17 (2000).
424. See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 193–94 (1997) (noting that the majority’s position in
Boerne “cannot be grounded in federalism, because . . . the relevant provision of the Constitu-
tion — the Fourteenth Amendment — cuts the other way.”).
425. See supra text accompanying notes 303–311.
426. There may also be legitimacy reasons to give Congress greater power to remedy racial
discrimination under the Reconstruction Amendments. See Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of
Hiram Revels, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1680, 1711–14 (2006).
427. See Post & Siegel, supra note 423; Jane S. Schacter, A Moment for Pragmatism, 113
Mich. L. Rev. 973, 978 (2015) (describing how social movements and political contestation
solidified these ideas).
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Conclusion
Explaining where we are now is no easy task. We could interpret Shelby
County as an application of the congruence-and-proportionality standard—
that is, as standing for the proposition that Boerne’s congruence-and-pro-
portionality requirement applies to legislation enacted under the Fifteenth
Amendment and that the preclearance process was not a congruent and pro-
portional exercise of Congress’s powers. Doing so would avoid explicitly in-
corporating into the law a principle that relies on unappealing ideas about
state dignity. But it also would not avoid many of the unfortunate conse-
quences of recognizing Shelby County’s focus on dignity, which are tied to
how the doctrine will uniquely limit Congress’s powers under the Recon-
struction Amendments.
We could instead embrace the fact that Shelby County focused on what
the VRA expressed about the covered states. Doing so would expose the
serious flaws with the Court’s analysis. But it may have some benefit as well.
In the Court’s words, the VRA was unique in how and why it differentiated
between the states: “The Voting Rights Act of 1965 employed extraordinary
measures to address an extraordinary problem.”428 While this could have
been a mark in the VRA’s favor, the VRA’s novelty is now a consolation
prize: it provides a way of distinguishing, and thus legitimizing, other federal
statutes that differentiate between the states, even if doing so requires vili-
fying the VRA.
428. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2618 (2013).
